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1.  Introduction 
Two important labor-market developments  of the last two decades  have 
attracted much  attention  in  recent  literature: increasing  and  persistent 
unemployment  in Europe,  and widening  wage  differentials across U.S. 
workers.  The marked increase of U.S. inequality is particularly striking if 
compared with the much lower and decreasing wage dispersion  of conti- 
nental  European  labor markets.  A transatlantic comparison  also reveals 
significant  differences  with  respect  to unemployment,  which  in Europe 
not only is higher than in the United States, but also appears more persis- 
tent across regions  and has larger long-term and youth  components. 
This paper documents  such facts, reviews  the relevant literature, and 
proposes  a unifying  perspective  on these  and other pieces  of evidence. 
We organize  our  discussion  around  a characterization  of labor-market 
institutions'  effects  on  labor  mobility  and  wage  determination  under 
uncertainty.  In a relatively  "flexible" dynamic  equilibrium,  as in Lucas 
and Prescott (1974) and Topel (1986), wage  differentials across standard- 
ized  units  of labor are consistent  with  equilibrium at a point  in time if 
mobility is costly for workers.  Such dynamic interactions may help inter- 
pret the portion of wage  inequality which remains unexplained  by static 
models  of wage  determination  in the United  States,  where  workers  do 
move  across firms, occupations,  and regions in response  to productivity 
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and  demand  shocks.  In Europe,  conversely,  institutional  rigidities  re- 
duce  wage  dispersion  and  employment  fluctuations:  hence,  mobility 
offers  limited  gains  to individual  workers  and  occurs at a much  lower 
speed.  Productivity  and  demand  fluctuations  have  more important  ef- 
fects  on  firms'  profits  if  they  cannot  induce  employment  and  wage 
changes  and,  as  in  the  models  of  Bentolila  and  Bertola  (1990)  and 
Bertola (1990),  expectations  of  future  downturns  induce  employers  to 
exercise  caution  when  hiring  in  upturns.  Job-security restrictions  and 
wage  compression  reduce  or  eliminate  frictional  unemployment,  but 
generate  persistent  or even  permanent  unemployment  if wages  are set 
above  the full-employment  level  in the aggregate  and in each of differ- 
ent regions  or other labor-market segments. 
We analyze  such  standard  models'  comparative-dynamics  properties 
in the  face of increased  idiosyncratic  uncertainty. In flexible labor mar- 
kets where  mobility  costs  are paid by workers,  the differentials needed 
to trigger labor reallocation  are larger in a more volatile  environment: 
more frequent shocks to labor's relative productivity in different sectors, 
regions,  or occupations  lead  to  wider  cross-sectional  wage  inequality 
and  to  more  labor-income  variability  at  the  individual  level.  In labor 
markets  where  wages  and  labor flows  are constrained  by institutional 
rigidities,  conversely,  the model  suggests  that a similar increase in idio- 
syncratic volatility should be associated with higher aggregate unemploy- 
ment  at given  wages,  as  hiring  employers  attach more  weight  to less 
heavily  discounted  negative  shocks.  These  results  match  the  evidence 
well,  suggesting  that increased volatility of labor demand may be a com- 
mon cause of increasing wage  dispersion  in the United States and higher 
unemployment  in Europe. 
We are certainly not the first to try and provide a coherent explanation 
for the  set  of facts that motivates  our analysis.  Section  2 collects  some 
relevant empirical evidence  and reviews previous approaches to its expla- 
nation.  Wood (1994) argues that the earning power of less-skilled  work- 
ers in developed  countries  was  hurt by trade linkages  with  developing 
countries,  which  reduced  low-skill  wages  in  the  United  States  and 
pushed  low-skill  labor jobs in Europe. Krugman (1994) similarly focuses 
on relative demand  shifts  for workers with  different skills: while  in the 
United  States  technological  change  has  been  absorbed  by  larger wage 
inequality,  in  Europe  the  preference  for  lower  wage  dispersion  has 
priced out of the market a large number of workers,  thereby increasing 
unemployment.  Both  technology  and  trade  can  certainly  explain  the 
increase  in U.S.  wage  inequality between  skill levels,  but it is harder for 
such  theoretical  perspectives  to interpret the equally  sharp increase  in 
wage  dispersion  across observationally  equivalent  workers.  As to Euro- Wage  Inequality  and Unemployment:  United  States  vs. Europe  *  15 
pean  unemployment,  it  may  or  may  not  have  hit  unskilled  workers 
harder than their skilled cohorts, but it certainly featured substantial and 
persistent  heterogeneity  across regions  and age groups. 
Section  3 considers  a simple  model  of labor allocation under idiosyn- 
cratic uncertainty,  and solves  it under two polar sets of assumptions:  in 
"flexible" markets, workers take mobility decisions and wage differentials 
insure  that efficient  labor reallocation does  take place in equilibrium; in 
"rigid" markets,  the wage is centrally set (hence independent  of idiosyn- 
cratic conditions),  and  labor  shedding  is  difficult-or,  for  simplicity, 
impossible-for  employers.  We then return to the evidence.  In Section 4.1 
we  argue  that various  stylized  facts may, at least qualitatively, be inter- 
preted  in light of American and European labor markets' "flexibility" or 
"rigidity." Section 4.2 brings the comparative-dynamics  theoretical impli- 
cations of higher idiosyncratic uncertainty to bear on labor-market devel- 
opments  of the last two decades.  Section 5 concludes,  outlining directions 
for further research and offering some speculation on the deeper determi- 
nants of different institutional  structures across the Atlantic. 
2.  Some  Comparative  Facts 
2.1 WAGE  INEQUALITY 
Increasing  U.S.  wage  inequality  during  the  1970s and  1980s is  exten- 
sively  documented  in the literature (see Levy and Murnane,  1992). Evi- 
dence  on  European  wage  dispersion,  while  not  as plentiful,  indicates 
patterns of decreasing  (or nonincreasing)  inequality instead.1 
The four panels  of Figure 1 plot log differentials between  the 90th and 
the 10th percentile  of wage  distributions.  The data are from Katz, Love- 
man,  and Blanchflower  (1995) and Erickson and Ichino (1995a), and we 
display  them  to  the  same  scale  for  the  United  States,  Great Britain, 
France,  and  Italy. In most  years  when  comparable  data are available, 
wage  differentials  are smallest  in Italy and largest in the United  States: 
only  Britain's inequality  is as low  as Italy's, and only in the 1970s; only 
France's wage  differentials are as high as the American ones,  and only in 
the 1960s. In the United States, the 90%-10% wage differential increases 
over the entire period  for both males and females,  and a similar pattern 
is observed  in Great Britain during the 1980s. Conversely, wage differen- 
1. Davis (1992) also presents  comparative international evidence  on wage inequality trends 
and contrasts increasing  dispersion  within advanced  economies  to wage compression  in 
some  developing  countries  (the latter fact is questioned  by Feenstra and Hanson,  1994). 
We focus  on  the  less  dramatic,  but  still quite  pronounced  differences  between  wage 
inequality  trends in the United States and Europe. 16  BERTOLA  & ICHINO 
Figure  1 OVERALL  WAGE  INEQUALITY 
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Fig.1C:  France  Fig.10:  Italy 
Notes:  Log differences  between the 90th and 10th  percentile  of the following 
data:  United States:  hourly wages (annual  earnings  divided by product  of 
weeks worked and usual weekly hours) of 18-64-year-old  full-time  workers 
from March  CPS. United Kingdom:  Gross hourly earnings for full-time  workers 
from New Earnings  Survey. France:  Gross annual earnings adjusted for hours 
differences for full-time, full-year  workers  from Declaration  Annual de Salaires. 
Italy:  Annual wage and salary earnings for full-time, full-year,  nonagricultural, 
non-self-employed  workers, 18 to 65 years old. 
tials are stable or moderately  decreasing  in France, in Italy, and in pre- 
1980 Great Britain. 
To some  extent,  the  overall  distribution  of  wages  and  its  dynamic 
evolution  may  be  explained  by  the  changing  structure of labor supply 
and  demand  across  skill levels.  The theoretical  perspective  of Murphy 
and Welch (1991), Krugman (1994), Wood (1994), and many other recent 
contributions  suggests  that  when  technological  progress  generates  a 
higher  relative  demand  for skilled  labor, competitive  markets increase 
wage  differentials across skill levels in the United States, while in Europe 
compressed  and  rigid  wage  differentials  cause  higher  unemployment 
among  unskilled  workers.  Increasing openness  to trade with developing 
countries,  where  cheap unskilled  labor abounds,  similarly threatens  the 
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vanced  economies:  competition  from LDCs decreases  low-skill wages  in 
full-employment  equilibrium,  and  prices  the  unskilled  out  of  work  if 
their wages  fail to respond. 
Even  when  jointly  considered,  however,  technology-  or trade-based 
demand-supply  mechanisms  may not account for the whole  evidence. 
Technology  and trade are certainly largely responsible  for the increasing 
inequality  between skill levels  in  the  United  States,  where  demand  for 
high-skill  workers  was  met by a strongly  increasing  supply  of college- 
educated  workers in the 1960s and 1970s, but not in the 1980s (Katz and 
Murphy,  1992).  However,  similar patterns  of  wage  dispersion  are ob- 
served  within groups  of  workers  with  the  same  measured  attributes. 
Figure 2 plots the time series behavior of the 90%-10% differential of the 
residuals  obtained  from regressing  wages  on experience,  education,  and 
other  observable  characteristics.  The  qualitative  character of  this  evi- 
dence  is the same as in Figure 1. Residual wage  differentials are stable in 
France and actually decrease  in Italy, where  wages  are extremely homo- 
geneous  within  worker-characteristic  cells.2 But unexplained  inequality 
increases  very strongly in the United States (throughout  the period) and 
in Britain (in the 1980s). This is more difficult, but certainly not impossi- 
ble, to interpret from the vantage  point of standard demand-and-supply 
mechanisms.  The very  similarity of Figures  1 and 2 makes  it clear that 
the  few  observable  worker  characteristics have  low  explanatory  power 
throughout  the  period  considered  and  for all countries.  If the  market 
value  of  unobservable  skill  components  changes  in  parallel with  that 
of readily  measurable  worker  characteristics,  then,  as argued  by Juhn, 
Murphy, and Pierce (1993), common  factors such as skill-biased progress 
or trade may  explain  the  similar dynamics  of "within" and  "between" 
wage  inequality. 
Reliance  on  unobservable  factors  makes  it  difficult  to  evaluate  the 
relevance  of structural imbalances,  however,  and leaves unexplained  the 
different  dynamic  behavior  of  skill premia  across  observed  and  unob- 
served components:  the former fall in the 1970s, while the latter increase 
throughout  the post-1970 period in Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce's empirical 
results.  The causes  of the increasing  within-group  U.S. wage  dispersion 
may become  easier  to identify  on analyzing  it jointly with  the similarly 
puzzling  within-group  wage  compression  that characterizes  European 
2. Erickson and Ichino (1995b) use  wage  data from the 1985 ENI survey  of Italian firms to 
compute  empirical measures  of wage dispersion  within detailed occupational categories. 
In the  47 categories  for which  comparable  data are available in the  1985 U.S.  Current 
Population  Survey,  the  standard  deviation  of log wages  averages  to 13% in the Italian 
sample,  to 37% in the whole  U.S.  sample,  and to a still very high 30% in the unionized 
portion of the U.S.  sample. 18 *  BERTOLA  & ICHINO 
Figure  2 WITHIN-GROUP  WAGE  INEQUALITY 
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Notes:  Log differences  between the 90th and 10th  percentile  of the following: 
United States: Residuals from cross-section  regression  for full-time  workers, by 
sex and year, of log hourly earnings on 10 schooling dummies, a quartic  in 
experience, interactions  of all the experience terms with broad education-level 
dummies, and a metropolitan-area  dummy. Sources: see Katz, Loveman, and 
Blanchflower  (1995).  United Kingdom:  Residual  from separate  cross-section 
regression for full-time workers, by sex and year, of gross hourly earnings on 
age dummies and a manual-worker  dummy. Sources:  see Katz, Loveman, and 
Blanchflower  (1995).  France:  Dispersion of wages within occupation,  control- 
ling for eight age groups. Sources:  see Katz, Loveman,  and Blanchflower 
(1995). Italy:  Residuals of separate cross-section  regressions, by years and sex, 
of annual wage and salary  earnings for full-time,  full-year,  nonagricultural 
workers, on experience, experience squared, five education dummies, and five 
age dummies. Sources:  see Erickson  and Ichino  (1995a). 
economies  and  by  considering  the  comparative  evidence  on  regional 
unemployment  rates in the next subsection. 
2.2 PERSISTENCE  OF REGIONAL  UNEMPLOYMENT  RATES 
If the comparison  between  Europe and the United States were limited to 
trends  in wage  inequality,  one might  think that what caused  increasing Wage  Inequality  and Unemployment:  United  States  vs. Europe  *  19 
Figure  3 STANDARDIZED  UNEMPLOYMENT  RATES 
Source:  OECD. 
13  - 
12  - 
11  - 




6  - 
5  - 
4  - 
-3 - 
71  73  75  77  79  81  83  85  87  89  91  93 
Year 
Fig.3A:  United  States 
.........  I  I  I 
13  - 
12- 
11  iI 
10  - 
9 
8- 
7  - 
6  - 
5 
4- 
7'1  73  75  77  79  81  83  85  87  89  91  93 
Year 
Fig.3C:  France 
71  73  75  77  79  81  83  85  87  89  91  93 
Year 
Fig.3B:  Great  Britain 
A/x 
71  73  75  77  79  81  83  85  87  89  91  93 
Year 
Fig.30:  Italy 
U.S.  dispersion  spared  the  old  continent.  But we  see  in Figure 3 that, 
while  in  the  1970s  all countries  display  similar patterns  of  increasing 
unemployment,  in  the  1980s France's and  Italy's stable wage  differen- 
tials are accompanied  by persistently  high unemployment,  while  in the 
United  States and Great Britain the counterpart of trending  wage  differ- 
entials in the last 15 years is a trendless and widely fluctuating unemploy- 
ment rate. 
This evidence  suggests  that whatever  caused  wage  dispersion  in the 
United  States  did  hit continental  Europe  too  but,  for institutional  rea- 
sons,  affected  employment  rather than wages.  As argued by Krugman 
(1994) and  Wood  (1994),  minimum-wage  regulations  and  other  wage 
rigidities  may have  prevented  European labor markets from reacting to 
skill-biased  technological  progress  and  to  increased  exposure  to  LDC 
imports  by reducing  low-end  wages.  In this view,  aggregate  shocks  are 
accommodated  in the United  States by lower  real wages  and in Europe 
by  higher  unemployment;  at  a  more  disaggregated  level,  structural 
shocks  which  lead  to  wider  wage  differentials  in  the  American  labor 
market cause  more dispersion  of European unemployment  rates (Burda 
and Mertens,  1994). 
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The evidence  on disaggregated  European unemployment  rates, how- 
ever, is not conclusively  supportive  of a structural view  of labor-market 
inequality.  If compressed  wage  differentials  and  rigid  low-end  wages 
clashed  with  reduced  demand  for low-skill  labor, then  the  unemploy- 
ment experience  of low-skill  European workers should  have been much 
worse  than that of their high-skill  contemporaries.  But while  the struc- 
ture  of  unemployment  is  markedly  different  across  the  Atlantic  with 
regard to the  incidence  of long-term  and youth  unemployment,  which 
are  much  more  important  in  Europe  than  in  the  United  States,3 the 
unemployment  experience  has been roughly similar across different skill 
groups  (Blanchard,  1995; Nickell  and  Bell,  1994). In Europe,  low-skill 
unemployment  increased  by more percentage  points  than high-skill un- 
employment,  but it was  also much higher to start with-and  is propor- 
tionally higher in the United States as well. 
Comparative  evidence  on  the persistence  of regional  unemployment 
rates offers further insights  into the structural features of U.S. and Euro- 
pean  labor markets.  Blanchard and Katz (1992) find that relative unem- 
ployment  rates increase  in American states hit by negative  shocks,  and 
that this triggers a dynamic process of wage and participation rate reduc- 
tion,  outmigration,  and gradual return to the initial unemployment  rate. 
While  disaggregated  wage  data are not available for European regions, 
strongly  centralized  wage  setting  does  not allow  relative wages  to vary 
as much  in Europe  as in the United  States  (Burda and Mertens,  1994). 
Decressin  and Fatas (1994) use  employment,  unemployment,  and labor 
participation data to replicate some of Blanchard and Katz's estimates  on 
data from various European countries. They find that, while (heterogene- 
ous)  regional  unemployment  rates  do  appear  mean-reverting  in  time 
series,  the long-run  response  of employment  shares to regional shocks is 
much  stronger  in the  United  States  than in Europe,  where  labor-force 
participation (rather than migration) plays the most important role in the 
medium-run  adjustment  process.  Jimeno and Bentolila (1995) also find 
that region-specific  shocks have persistent  employment  effects in Spain, 
where  available regional  wage  data indicate that wages  do not strongly 
respond  to local unemployment  rates. 
We report  simpler  and  slightly  different  statistics  on  the  geographic 
structure of unemployment  in Europe and the United States, with an eye 
3. The long-term  (one year or more) component  of U.S. unemployment  was 4.2% in 1979, 
9.5% in 1985, and 5.6% in 1990; in Italy, over the same period, the incidence  of long-term 
unemployment  rose from 51.2% to 71.1% (see OECD Employment  Outlook,  1993, p. 87, for 
these  and  other  data).  Unemployed  teenagers  are about  three  times  more  numerous 
than their adult counterparts  in the U.S.,  and up to 9 times in Italy (see OECD Employ- 
ment Outlook, 1994, p. 22, for these  and other data). Wage  Inequality  and Unemployment:  United States vs. Europe  * 21 
Table 1  MEAN REGRESSION OF REGIONAL UNEMPLOYMENT RATES 
Country  After 2 Years  After 5 Years  After 7 Years 
U.S.  -.21  -.49  -.60 
(.07)  (.11)  (.10) 
Great Britain  .00  -.01  -.12 
(.03)  (.04)  (.05) 
France  .13  .04  -.01 
(.05)  (.06)  (.07) 
Italy  .03  .36  .68 
(.07)  (.08)  (.12) 
Note:  The table  reports  the point estimate  and standard  error  (in parentheses)  of /  from  cross-sectional 
regressions  in the form Au' = a  +  3SuQ  + E, run separately  for each country  and period:  i denotes a 
region, uM  is regional  unemployment  in 1982  (for  the United States)  and 1983  (for  the other  countries), 
and Au'  is the variation  of the unemployment  rate  over the following  t years.  The constant  (not shown) 
absorbs  the effects of aggregate  unemployment  changes. Regional  units: 50 states for the U.S., and 
provinces  at the NUTS  3 level of disaggregation  of the REGIO  Eurostat  Databank  (62  for  Great  Britain;  96 
for France;  95 for Italy). 
to showing  that  what  Blanchard  and  Katz  call a "moderately  rapid  return 
to the  mean"  for the  United  States  is indeed  quite  fast in comparison  with 
the  evidence  for  Great  Britain,  France,  and  Italy.  We  regress  regional 
unemployment-rate  changes  on  their  initial  values,  for periods  of differ- 
ent length  during  the  1980s.  We have  experimented  with  various  specifica- 
tions  of this  regression  on  available  regional  unemployment  data  for U.S. 
states  and  for regions  defined  at the  NUTS  3 level  of disaggregation  from 
the  Eurostat  Databank  REGIO.  Regardless  of  whether  unemployment 
enters  the  regression  in logs  or in levels,  and  of the  starting  year,  we  find 
that  regression  to the  aggregate  mean  is much  faster  in the  United  States 
than  in  European  countries. 
We  report  one  example  in  Table  1.  The  starting  year  is  1983  (1982  for 
the  U.S.),  and  unemployment  is  measured  in  levels;  the  intercept, 
which  is  allowed  to  differ  across  countries,  absorbs  the  effects  of aggre- 
gate  unemployment  changes  and  is  not  reported.  In  the  United  States, 
the  cross-sectional  coefficient  of  the  states'  initial  unemployment  rate 
becomes  more  negative  (and  significant)  when  the  length  of  the  spell 
increases.  In  agreement  with  Blanchard  and  Katz's  findings,  regional 
unemployment  rates  are  not  persistent,  and  their  reversion  towards  the 
aggregate  mean  is  stronger  over  longer  intervals.4  Great  Britain  offers  a 
4. Blanchard and  Katz's  specification  constrains  dynamic  adjustment  to be the  same  for 
different  years,  and allows  for region-specific  intercepts,  or "permanent" differences  in 
regional  unemployment  rates. The dispersion  of such intercepts and the speed  of mean 
reversion  jointly  determine  the  size  of the  coefficient  reported  in the  table,  which  in- 
dexes  the  extent  to which  unemployment  rates tend  towards  a common  mean  over the 
period considered. 22 *  BERTOLA  & ICHINO 
different  picture:  mean  regression  becomes  significant  only  over  the 
longer  spell  of  7 years,  and  even  then  the  estimate  implies  a  much 
higher  persistence  than in the United  States; in France, there is no sign 
of statistically significant mean regression  even after 7 years; in Italy, the 
coefficient  of lagged  regional unemployment  is significantly positive and 
increases  with  the  length  of  the  time  spell-indicating  that  regional 
unemployment  rates diverged  from each other over the sample  period. 
Taken at face value,  this regression  evidence  indicates that regional fixed 
effects are relatively unimportant  in the United States: the states do tend 
all to return to the  same  mean,  and fairly quickly. In Europe,  quite the 
opposite  seems  to happen:  regional unemployment  rates at best regress 
very  slowly  to the mean,  or even  diverge  widely  as in the case of Italy. 
Such regression  results  may or may not indicate  that regional unem- 
ployment  rates are continuously  reshuffled  over time, as negative  coeffi- 
cients in Table 1 would  be consistent  with unemployment  converging  to 
similar values  from initial unexplained  heterogeneity.  For the same four 
countries,  we  have  computed  the rank correlation coefficients  between 
regional  unemployment  rates in a given  year and in the years that fol- 
low. Figure 4 is based on 1980 as the initial year for the United States and 
on  1983 for Great Britain, France,  and  Italy.5 In Europe,  even  after 10 
years,  the  rank correlation coefficient  is high  and  stable.  In the United 
States,  the rank correlation is comparable  to its European counterparts 
after one  year, but  drops  quickly  to almost  half the  initial value  when 
longer periods  are considered. 
2.3 THE  PIECES  OF THE  PUZZLE 
This section  has drawn  attention  to two  sets of facts. Wages of workers 
with  similar  observable  characteristics  are highly  and  increasingly  dis- 
persed  in the United States, highly and increasingly compressed  in Europe. 
The size  and ranking of regional unemployment  rates are both strongly 
persistent  in Europe, while  in the United States unemployment  rates are 
reshuffled  quite  rapidly.  When  jointly  considered,  these  labor-market 
facts suggest  that within-group  wage inequality may be the driving force 
of  labor reallocation  in  the  United  States,  while  the  absence  of  wage 
dispersion  limits  the extent  of labor reallocation in Europe. This simple 
observation  sets  the  stage  for our formal analysis  in  the  next  section. 
Leaving  in the background  the relatively familiar implications  of aggre- 
5. Within the time period for which data are available (1970-1990 for the U.S. and 1983-1992 
for Europe) the substance  of the results does not change across initial years. This figure is 
the  least  favorable  to our case.  For most  of the  other  initial years  on  which  we  have 
experimented  the  U.S.  rank correlation  coefficient  decreases  even  more  strongly  and 
often reaches zero, while  European data always display strong and positive  persistence. Wage  Inequality  and Unemployment:  United  States  vs. Europe  .  23 
Figure  4 PERSISTENCE  OF REGIONAL  UNEMPLOYMENT  RANKING 
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1) levels of aggregation.  Source:  REGIO  Databank,  Eurostat. 
gate  events,  we  focus  on  the idiosyncratic  and dynamic  dimensions  of 
available evidence. 
3.  Flexible  vs. Rigid  Labor  Markets 
We proceed  to specify  a simple  dynamic  model  of idiosyncratic  uncer- 
tainty  and  to  derive  its  solution  under  different  labor-market institu- 
tions,  meant to represent in a stylized  way the U.S. process of wage  and 
employment  adjustment  in  contrast  to  the  labor  demand  and  wage 
rigidities which  characterize European markets. The demand  side of the 
labor market is populated  by a continuum  of production  sites,  indexed 
by  i  E  [0,  1],  which  may  represent  different  industries,  or  different 
geographical  locations,  or different occupations  within  a single  produc- 
tive  structure:  in  what  follows,  we  shall  refer to  them  as  "firms" for 
brevity. Individual  firms are distinct from each other because of heteroge- 24 *  BERTOLA  & ICHINO 
neous  labor  productivity  and,  crucially, because  labor mobility  across 
them is costly. We let the marginal revenue  product of labor at firm i and 
time  t be  a decreasing  function  it(.)  of lt, the  number  (or measure)  of 
workers  employed.  For purposes  of  illustration,  we  will  work  with  a 
linear functional  form with constant  slope:6 
7rt(1a) =  t-  /31  (1) 
To introduce  (potential) labor mobility in the simplest possible way, we 
let the productivity  index a follow a two-state Markov chain. If at equals 
ac (for "good"), firm i continues  to enjoy good productivity with probabil- 
ity 1 -  p, but with probability p it experiences  a negative shock and at+1  = 
aB  <  aG.  To simplify  notation,  let the opposite  transition have the same 
probability, so that the "bad" state where at =  aB also persists with proba- 
bility 1 -  p. 
The symmetric  transition probabilities of firm-level productivity 
acGwith prob.  p if at  =  aB, with prob. 1 -  p if at  = 
aG, 
a  -t+l  (2) 
aB  with  prob. 1 -  p if at =  aB,  with prob. p if at =  aG 
imply that the ergodic or long-run probability is 50% that a given  firm is 
in  either  state.  We  shall  study  the  cross-sectional  characteristics  of  a 
steady  state where  aC  = aC for half of the fixed measure of existing firms, 
while  a\ =  aB for the others.  Again for simplicity, and consistently  with 
our focus  on  cross-sectional  issues  within  the labor market rather than 
on aggregate  aspects,  we take the aggregate labor supply  to be fixed and 
homogeneous:  L units  of standardized  labor input are available for em- 
ployment  by the firms in question.  We refer to such units as "workers" 
for brevity,  but  we  emphasize  at the  outset  that they  need  not  corre- 
spond  to  real  (nonstandardized)  individuals,  whose  productivity  and 
labor income  would  depend  on  their education,  strength,  health,  and 
other observable  or unobservable  indicators of ability. All such heteroge- 
neity  across  individuals  is,  by  assumption,  absent  from  our  model, 
which  concentrates  on  how  wage  dynamics  and wage  dispersion  may 
originate  from heterogeneity  on the demand  rather than on the supply 
side of the labor market. 
To understand  how  productivity  dynamics  translate into wage  differ- 
entials,  it is useful  to briefly review  a familiar case where  they do not. If 
6. This choice of functional  form  entails  some loss of generality,  of course,  but recommends 
itself for its tractability  and because a linear marginal  revenue product schedule is 
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labor can be freely allocated  to the highest  bidder among  potential  em- 
ployers,  and competitive  labor demand  equates  wages  to marginal pro- 
ductivity,  then employers'  heterogeneity  does  not, in equilibrium, imply 
heterogeneous  wages  for identical  workers.  Labor must  be allocated  at 
time  t so that i,(l1) =  wt for all i, i.e.,  so as to equalize  labor's marginal 
productivity  in  all active  firms.  In the  linear case  of equation  (1),  this 
condition  is readily solved  for the levels  of employment  as functions  of 
the wage  and the firm's productivity  index a: 
oG _  W  t  B  aB  (3) 
In steady  state, the unit measure of firms is evenly  split across the two 
productivity  states, and the market's full-employment  condition reads (lG 
+  lB)/2  =  L. The market-clearing wage  rate (and all labor units' marginal 
revenue  product) is given  by 
z  =  -(aG  +  aB) -  FL,  (4) 
and labor is allocated across firms according to 
1 aG  -  a  1 aG -  aC  =  L +  -  B,  =  L -  (5)  2  p3  2  t 
as long as the parameters are such that iB >  0. 
The labor allocation  (iG,  P) and the (single) wage  rate that supports  it 
are not at all influenced  by the stochastic nature of firms' labor demand, 
as indexed  by p. Productivity differences across firms lead to unbalanced 
labor allocation:  to equalize  the decreasing  marginal productivity  of all 
employment  opportunities,  more  than  the  mean  available  labor  L is 
allocated  to good  firms, less  to bad firms. An allocation where  all stan- 
dardized  units of labor are paid the same wage  regardless of where  they 
are employed,  of course,  maximizes  the market's efficiency, or the total 
producers'  surplus  as measured  by the area beneath  the marginal reve- 
nue  product  schedules.  All that matters for wage  determination  in this 
essentially  static  equilibrium  is  average  productivity  across  firms  and 
total labor supply,  at a given  point in time: both quantities  are constant 
in our simple model,  but time variation would be irrelevant to an equilib- 
rium where  neither firms nor workers ever need to take forward-looking 
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3.1 A FLEXIBLE  LABOR  MARKET  WITH  MOBILITY  COSTS 
Despite  its  essentially  static  nature,  the  perfect-flexibility  equilibrium 
just discussed  is supported  by ongoing  labor reallocation,  since,  by (2), 
the identity (if not the number) of good  and bad firms changes  over time. 
In every  period,  a proportion  p of the firms experiences  a productivity 
shock: V2p  firms  suffer  a transition  from  high  to  low  productivity, V2p 
firms enjoy  the  opposite  transition,  and  p(lG -  IB)/2 units  of labor are 
relocated from formerly good  to newly  good  firms. 
The  simple  derivations  above  assumed  such  reallocation  to be  com- 
pletely  costless,  so  that  worker  mobility  across  firms  could  bid  wage 
rates into complete  equality. In a modern economy, by contrast, employ- 
ment  relationships  entail  highly  specific  human  capital,  and  mobility 
across employers  (occupations,  geographic  locations,  etc.) is costly and 
time-consuming.  Some  but certainly not  all such  costs  are financed  by 
employers  in  reality: the  portion  of  mobility  and  retraining  costs  that 
would  qualify a worker for employment  by any of a group of indepen- 
dently  managed  firms cannot be financed by one of them,  as the others 
could free-ride on this investment.  We proceed to study the equilibrium 
effects  of worker-financed  mobility costs,  maintaining  for simplicity  the 
assumption  that all market participants are wage  takers.7 
As  will  be  apparent  below,  equilibrium  wage  rates  do  differ  across 
currently "good" and currently "bad" firms in equilibrium.  Let the pro- 
ductivity  state  of  firms  be  revealed  at  the  beginning  of  each  period. 
Employees  then choose  whether  to stay, earning wB  (wG)  if their employer 
is  "bad" ("good"),  or move  to  a different  employer.  If p <  V2,  so  that 
productivity  states  have  positive  persistence,  the  mobility  option  will 
only  need  to  be  considered  by  the  employees  of  currently bad  firms. 
These  are faced with  a choice between  staying in the current job, which 
pays a low and likely stagnant wage,  and moving  to a firm that currently 
is (and is expected  to remain) more highly  productive. 
We shall measure  mobility costs in terms of the difference  between  the 
labor income  of a stayer and that of a mover.  If wB  denotes  the equilib- 
rium wage  of a worker who  chooses  to remain in a "bad" firm, let wB  -  k 
denote  the  period  income  of  a worker  who  prefers  to  try and  seek  a 
higher  wage  elsewhere:  this expression,  which  might well  be negative, 
could  literally represent  income  wb net  of a search cost k if we  picture 
7. This is readily  rationalized  if two or more employers  engage in Bertrand  wage competi- 
tion at each site. More  complex  models recognize  that match-specific  investments  intro- 
duce elements of monopsony and/or monopoly in employment relationships,  and re- 
place wage-taking  behavior  by bilateral  bargaining;  see Mortensen  and Pissarides  (1994) 
and Bertola and Caballero  (1994) for recent treatments  and further references. This 
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such individuals  as still employed  in their old job while  searching.  It is 
quite convenient,  however,  to index  mobility  costs  in such  differential- 
income  terms  even  if individuals  are unemployed  when  searching,  as 
we assume  below.8 
Mobility occurs in equilibrium if the costly investment  of k in terms of 
current income  is compensated  by (the expectation  of) higher labor in- 
come  in the future.  The forward-looking  nature of this choice  makes  it 
necessary  to specify  the workers'  dynamic  opportunity  set.  We denote 
by r >  0 the opportunity  cost of funds  for all workers,  and we  suppose 
for simplicity  that workers  are risk-neutral.9 Further, we  suppose  that 
each worker ceases  to participate in the labor market (or quits for reasons 
unrelated  to wages)  with  constant  probability 8/(1 +  8) >  0,  while  an 
inflow  of new  workers of measure  L8/(1 +  8) per period keeps  the labor 
force constant  at L. 
If mobility does  take place and both good  and bad firms have positive 
employment  levels  in equilibrium,  then  the employees  of a firm in bad 
business  conditions  must  be  indifferent  between  the  two  alternatives 
open  to them: that of remaining employed  in a bad firm, at the relatively 
low  wage  wB, and  that  of  paying  the  mobility  cost  k with  an  eye  to 
improving  their  future  labor-income  outlook.  Appendix  A  shows  that 
the wage  differential across good  and bad jobs in our model  satisfies 
Wi-h  WB (a  ifrlabS1  l)- 2p 
(6) 
with equality if labor mobility occurs in equilibrium. 
Condition  (6) is readily interpreted.  Identical labor units  can and  do 
receive  different pay at a point in time if k >  0, so that mobility is costly 
for workers.  The sustainable  wage  differential is smallest when  p = 0: if 
productivity  differences  across firms are permanent,  then wG  -  wB  -  (r + 
8)k, the annuity  value of the mobility cost. Less persistence  of productiv- 
ity differences  increases  the option value of not moving,  and the equilib- 
rium wage  differential is larger the closer to V2  is the probability p that the 
firm towards  which  the  worker moves  turns bad immediately  and  the 
8. Readers should  be warned  at this point that the k featured in our formulae may or may 
not have a structural interpretation if mobility costs realistically include the opportunity 
cost of time  spent  relocating  and searching  for a new  job and,  like wages,  are endoge- 
nous  in equilibrium. 
9. Alternatively, workers could be risk-averse, but use insurance contracts to finance mobil- 
ity  costs  and  maintain  a smooth  consumption  profile  in  the  face of their employers' 
productivity  shocks.  Such contracts hardly exist in reality, of course: we  briefly discuss 
the implications  of workers' attitudes  towards risk in the concluding  section below. 28 *  BERTOLA  & ICHINO 
reallocation  cost  is ex post  wasted.  If p = V2, wages  are independently 
distributed  over  time  at  every  firm: the  present  discounted  value  of 
future wages  is then independent  of current wages,  no wage differential 
can be so large as to induce  costly mobility choices,  and (6) reduces  to a 
nonbinding  inequality  (as  is  always  the  case  if  costly  mobility  is  not 
attractive) with  an infinite right-hand  side. 
In the more interesting  case where  productivity  is persistent  (p < 12), 
workers compare the future (and discounted)  expected benefits of mobil- 
ity with its immediate  cost k. If the model does feature equilibrium mobil- 
ity, then  (6) holds  with  equality, and good  firms pay higher wages  than 
bad ones.  The equilibrium wage  differential ~, as defined in (6), depends 
on k >  0 and  on  dynamic  parameters  such  as p, r, and  5, which  were 
completely  irrelevant  in the full-flexibility k =  0 case.  Symmetrically, it 
does  not  depend  on  any  of  the  parameters  which  determine  the  full- 
flexibility wage  in our simple model,  not even on the absolute productiv- 
ity differential ac -  aB.  In the class of models  represented  by the one we 
discuss,  equilibrium wage differentials reflect the degree of dynamic insta- 
bility, as indexed by p, rather than other determinants of static heterogene- 
ity and idiosyncratic  dynamics  across employment  opportunities. 
The  shape  and  position  of the marginal-revenue  functions  it(.)  only 
become  relevant  as we  proceed  to close  the model.  Since firms bear no 
turnover costs,  iT(lt)  must be equal to the relevant market wage  at every 
point  in time,  and labor demand  must be consistent  with  (given)  labor 
supply  at the  aggregate  level.  In this  respect,  it is useful  to recognize 
explicitly that labor relocation is time- as well as resource-consuming:  to 
capture  the idea  of "frictional unemployment".  in the simplest  possible 
way,  we  let all workers  who  choose  to exercise  the mobility  option  re- 
main  unemployed  for the  duration  of  one  period.  Then,  the  market- 
clearing condition  equates the total employment,  V2lG  + V2lB,  to the differ- 
ence  between  the  labor  force  L and  the  measure  p(lG  -  IB)/2 of  frictional 
unemployment:  in equilibrium, 
(1  +  p)lG  +  (1  -  p)lB  =  2L.  (7) 
In  the  linear  case,  equilibrium  wages  and  employment  levels  are 
readily  obtained  by inserting  in (7) labor-demand  expression  similar to 
(3), and recognizing  that wages  paid by good and bad firms differ accord- 
ing to (6). The resulting  expressions  are reported in the Appendix,  and 
the character of the solution  is illustrated in Figure 5. The length  of the 
top panel's  horizontal  axis equals 2L, employment  at a low-productivity 
firm is measured  from left to right, employment  at a high-productivity 
firm is measured  from right to left, and the sloping  lines  plot the corre- Wage  Inequality  and  Unemployment:  United  States  vs. Europe  *  29 
Figure  5 EQUILIBRIA  OF A FLEXIBLE  LABOR  MARKET  WITH  COSTLY 
WORKER  MOBILITY 
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sponding  marginal-revenue  product  schedules.  The  perfect-flexibility 
equilibrium  is  found  at  their  intersection:  if  mobility  were  costless 
(k = 0), there would  be no unemployment,  and all standardized  units of 
labor would  earn the same wage regardless of the frequency p of idiosyn- 
cratic productivity  shocks.  For the values of other parameters reported in 
cq 
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the  figure,  about  20% of  the  labor force  would  be  employed  by  low- 
productivity  firms, about 80% by high-productivity  firms. 
The  figure  illustrates  costly-mobility  equilibria  for  a  variety  of  p- 
values,  taking k = 0.1 (about a third of the perfect-flexibility wage rate) in 
all cases.10 In the top panel,  the length  of the vertical dashed  lines repre- 
sents  5,  the  equilibrium  wage  differential:  it  follows  from  (6),  and  is 
apparent in Figure 5, that wage  differentials unambiguously  grow larger 
when  larger and larger values  of p are considered.  Panel (a) of the figure 
plots  against  p the  level  of  "good" and  "bad" wages,  as dashed  lines, 
along with a continuous  line representing  the reference value zw  of wages 
in  the  perfectly  flexible  baseline  from equation  (4). For the  parameter 
values  in  the  figure,  the  "bad" wage  is always  lower  than  z,  and  the 
"good" wage  always  higher.11 It may also be interesting  to note that the 
average  wage  earned by employed  workers,  displayed  as a dotted  line, 
is always  higher than the reference level zw  when  mobility is costly and p 
>  0: if workers  do need  to relocate in equilibrium, unemployed  workers 
not only contribute nothing  to total production  in a static sense,  but also 
fail to bid down  marginal productivity  and wages  at either their former 
or next employer's  downward-sloping  labor demands. 
In the  top  panel  of Figure 5,  horizontal  solid  lines  are drawn  at the 
level of the market-clearing "bad" wage.  The model's  equilibrium condi- 
tion requires that the marginal revenue  product (and wage)  of bad-firm 
employees  be 5 units  lower  than its counterpart at good  firms, and the 
reverse-L shapes  formed by pairs of solid and dashed  lines labeled by a 
p-value identify  the corresponding  steady-state  equilibria: for larger val- 
ues  of p, the  difference  between  lG  and  IB becomes  smaller because,  de- 
spite  the increasing  wage  differentials,  mobility becomes  less  attractive 
for workers. 
Panel (b) of Figure 5 displays  the employment  levels  of good  and bad 
firms,  and  panel  (c) the rate of unemployment  in the market's equilib- 
rium.  A larger p decreases  the difference between  employment  at good 
and bad firms and,  as the overall productivity  of labor is higher  in the 
former than in the latter, reduces the total producer surplus (measured by 
10. The mobility  cost k was defined above as the difference  between the labor  income of a 
stayer and the labor  income of an otherwise identical  mover. We acknowledge  in this 
footnote that mobility  costs are  not independent  of equilibrium  wages if, as we assume, 
they include forgone income from unemployment. If the model is taken literally,  the 
difference between k and wb  represents out-of-pocket  mobility costs (or subsidies, if 
negative). It might be desirable  to keep these rather  than k fixed as we vary p in the 
figure, but this would complicate  the algebra  without adding much to our stylized 
model. 
11. This need not be the case in general:  for small values of 5, mobility  costs may increase 
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the area below  the marginal-revenue  product schedules  in the first panel) 
even before taking relocation costs into account. Panel (c) of Figure 5 plots 
the unemployment  rate, which,  conversely, is not a monotonic function of 
the "turbulence" index p. Unemployment  is directly related to the equilib- 
rium amount  of mobility, as the unemployment  rate at a point in time is 
given by the ratio of the measure of workers moving each period, p(lG -  IB)/ 
2, to the fixed measure  L of the total labor force. A "Laffer  curve" mecha- 
nism is at work: if the employment  differential IG  -  IB  could be kept fixed, a 
higher  p would  certainly  lead  to more  unemployment;  but  a higher  p 
discourages  mobility, and the model has ambiguous  predictions as to the 
relationship  between  p and frictional unemployment. 
3.2 A RIGID  LABOR  MARKET 
We  contrast  the  previous  section's  market  model  with  the  allocation 
implied  by  different  institutional  arrangements,  meant  to  represent  a 
caricature of "rigid" European  labor markets: labor reallocation is ham- 
pered by centralized  wage  setting,  which  reduces or eliminates workers' 
incentives  to bear mobility  costs,  and by job-security provisions,  which 
reduce flows  into and out of unemployment. 
The technological  structure of the market is identical to that assumed 
above: a continuum  of production  sites or "firms" employ units of homo- 
geneous  labor, whose  marginal productivity is a decreasing (and stochas- 
tic) function  of employment  at each firm; we  shall again use as a simple 
example  the  linear  relationship  (1) with  stochastic  intercept.  We sup- 
pose,  however,  that the wage  rate is exogenously  set and, crucially, that 
it  does  not  differ  across  firms.  Further, we  assume  that  employment 
relationships  may not be dissolved  because  of changing  business  condi- 
tions: workers  cannot  be "fired," and employment  at firm i varies only 
through  labor attrition at rate 8 and hiring. 
For simplicity, we assume  that no costs other than wage  payments  are 
borne  by firms: hiring  costs  are zero,  and firing costs  are prohibitively 
large. We let employers  be risk-neutral, still denoting  their discount  rate 
by r, and we  may again allow for possible  labor attrition at rate 8: only a 
fraction 1/(1+  ) of the  current employees  remain with  the firms across 
periods,  while  new  entrants in the market keep the labor force constant. 
Given  that no worker is ever fired, as long as worker-initiated  turnover 
corresponds  to flows into and out of the labor force, only new entrants in 
the market can ever be unemployed.  We shall refer to this obvious  impli- 
cation of our and similar models  of "job security" when  returning to the 
data below,  and contrast it with the potentially very different structure of 
unemployment  in  the  costly-worker-mobility  model  above-where  all 
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equilibrium,  and  little could  be  said as to (say) the age composition  of 
those  among  them  who  did choose  to move  rather than accept a wage 
reduction. 
A  positive  rate  of  labor  attrition  complicates  derivation  of  labor- 
demand  policies,  however,  and we  prefer to discuss  the relevant  intu- 
ition on the role of p in a rigid labor market for the limit case of no labor 
attrition (8 =  0). In a steady  state,  half the firms are "good," while  the 
other half find themselves  in bad business  conditions  and, having inher- 
ited  a stable  labor force from their own  past hiring decisions,  have  no 
choice but to wait for better times.  The allocation of employment  is then 
strongly  history-dependent,  but we  shall focus  on  a symmetric  steady 
state where  employment  is the same I across all firms and for all time. 
Appendix  B shows  that, under the linear specification of equation  (1), 
optimal labor-demand  policies by firms lead to 
I  =  1  -  2p  )  aG +  )  a  - 
j82p  2p + r  2p +rI  \ 
a  -w  (2p  r  G  -  aB 
-  P 
) 
C 
-aCB  (8)  = 
( 
- 
( 2/2p  +  r ) 
This expression  is readily interpreted as the employment  level chosen by 
a firm which,  experiencing  "good" business  conditions,  is at least poten- 
tially  hiring  at the  margin-and  knows  labor will  never  leave  it.  The 
given  wage  is compared not with the current ("good") marginal revenue 
product  of labor, but with  a weighted  average of that and of the lower 
marginal revenue  product  it will experience  in bad business  conditions 
(which  arrive with  probability p per period).  For the linear specification 
of  our  example,  we  see  in  the  first line  of  (8) that  also  the  level  of 
employment  is  a  weighted  average  of  the  two  levels  that  would  be 
chosen  if firing (as well  as hiring) were allowed  at the given  wage.  The 
weight  given  to the  "good"-business-conditions  indicator is increasing 
in  the  firm's  discount  rate  r: clearly, in  the  limit  r ->  oo firms  would 
behave  myopically,  and the ex post negative  marginal value  of employ- 
ment  in  bad  states  would  not  discourage  them  from  hiring  in  good 
times. 
If the  discount  rate is zero,  at the  other extreme,  employment  at all 
firms is determined  by a simple average of aG and aB. As the two produc- 
tivity states have equal weights  in the market's cross section as well as in 
each firm's (linear) labor-demand policy, the relationship between  aggre- 
gate labor demand  and the single  wage  w is the same as in the flexible 
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section.  With linear marginal productivities,  therefore, the same wage  is 
consistent  with  full employment  in a rigid model  where  r =  0 and in a 
hypothetical  fully  flexible model.  If r >  0, conversely,  current business 
conditions  receive a larger weight  than future (and discounted)  develop- 
ments:  since  only  "good" firms are hiring,  this induces  an upward  bias 
both in the average labor demand  of an individual  firm and in the aggre- 
gate labor demand  of a large group of similar firms.12 
Figure 6 illustrates  the character of the solution,  for the same parame- 
ter values  used in Figure 5. In the top panel, the solid lines again plot the 
marginal  revenue  product  of a "bad" firm as a function  of its employ- 
ment  (measured  left  to  right),  and  of a "good" firm that employs  the 
complement  to full employment  (measured  right to left).  Dashed  lines 
plot the mirror images  of these  schedules:  a currently "bad" firm knows 
that with  probability p it may receive a positive  shock, in which  case the 
marginal revenue  of its unchanged  labor force would  be evaluated along 
the  downward-sloping  dashed  line; symmetrically,  a currently  "good" 
firm's  marginal  revenue  schedule  may  drop  from the  upward-sloping 
solid line to the lower  dashed  line. 
We  know  from  (8)  that  the  present  discounted  value  of  marginal 
productivity  is  a weighted  average  of  the  two  relevant  schedules  for 
each firm, and that it should  be equal to the wage  if the currently good 
firm is not hiring: the  solid  horizontal  line in the figure is drawn  at an 
arbitrary wage  level  (w  =  0.45),  and  its  length  measures  the  units  of 
labor  that  remain  unemployed,  at  that  wage,  if  the  probability  of 
shocks  equals  an  equally  arbitrary p =  0.25.  The wage  is higher  than 
labor's marginal  revenue  product  at the bad firm (marked by a square 
on  the  downward-sloping  solid  line),  but  lower  than  its  counterpart 
along  the  good  firm's  marginal  revenue  product  (also  marked  by  a 
square  on  the  solid  line  representing  a currently good  firm's marginal 
revenue  product  schedule,  and on the mirror-image dashed  line repre- 
senting  the currently bad firm's notional labor demand  upon  realization 
of a positive  shock). 
The  lower  three  panels  of Figure 6 explore  the implications  of more 
pronounced  instability for the rigid labor market. It is apparent in the top 
panel  that,  for any  value  of p, there exists  a wage  level  low  enough  to 
insure  full employment  of the  given  labor force: panel  (a) displays  the 
full-employment  wage  level  as a function  of p, along with the reference 
12. See Bertola  (1990,  1994)  for further  discussion of such "discounting  effects,"  and of the 
effects of nonlinear  functional  forms. For  realistic  parametrizations,  the order  of magni- 
tude of the discounting effect is the same as that of Jensen-inequality  biases due to 
nonlinear  marginal  revenue product  schedules, which are of ambiguous  sign and may 
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Figure  6 A RIGID  LABOR  MARKET  WITH  UNIFORM  WAGES  AND NO- 
FIRING  CONSTRAINTS 
employment  in  a  low-productivity  firm  --  ---  in  a  high-productivity  firm 
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wage  zb  which  would  clear the hypothetical  perfectly flexible labor mar- 
ket  discussed  at  the  beginning  of  this  section.  Under  linear  labor de- 
mand,  the  two  lines  would  coincide  for r =  0: but r =  0.05  >  0 in the 
figure,  and the discounting  effect yields  full employment  at wage  levels 
that are uniformly  higher than the crossing  point of the solid lines in the 
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occur sooner  and  are less  heavily  discounted  by hiring firms, who  will 
employ  half of the labor force only at lower and lower wages. 
Panel  (b) displays  the  labor-demand  effects  of  larger p-values,  and 
panel  (c) displays  the  complementary  unemployment  schedule,  when 
the wage w is kept fixed at the level that would yield full employment  for 
p = 0.18. As for all the other parameters of this extremely stylized model, 
it would  be misleading  to attach much meaning  to the value  of p: in the 
figure,  we  choose  to illustrate  the effects  of higher  uncertainty  starting 
from full employment  at p = 0.18, because Figure 5 (drawn for the same 
parameter  values)  tells  us  that p-values  in that region  would  not  have 
dramatic effects on unemployment  in a flexible labor market. The unem- 
ployment  rate of the rigid market, conversely,  definitely  rises with  p in 
panel (c) of Figure 6: the next section will bring this finding to bear on the 
evidence. 
3.2.1  On Wage  Determination  The derivations and figures above not only 
constrain  the wage  to be the same at all firms, but also take its absolute 
level  as given.  It is conceptually  straightforward,  however,  to append  a 
wage-setting  mechanism  to the disaggregated  model  outlined  above (or 
to  more  complex  variants  with  positive  rates  of  labor attrition and/or 
realistic dynamics  of productivity).  Involuntary unemployment  may per- 
sist in equilibrium  without  exerting pressure  on wages  if these  are con- 
tracted by currently employed  workers, as in the standard insider-outsider 
models  (Lindbeck  and  Snower,  1988). Alternatively,  firms may  find  it 
profitable not to lower wages if higher compensation  levels enhance work- 
ers' productivity  according  to efficiency-wage  theories  (Katz, 1986). We 
have little new  to say on wage-setting  mechanisms,  and in the rest of the 
paper  we  analyze  empirical  implications  of our stylized  description  of 
rigid and flexible economies,  taking it for granted that standard explana- 
tions of wage  rigidity may be at work. 
Some obvious interactions of institutional rigidities for wage determina- 
tion  are worth  mentioning,  however.  In the presence  of a contrast be- 
tween  insiders  and  outsiders,  the  wage  of the former depends  on  the 
rents that a monopolistic  union  can extract from firms. Since firing costs 
prevent  the  substitution  of  the  employed  workers,  their presence  in- 
creases the bargaining power of the insiders and therefore the size of the 
rents  that  they  can  extract.  Thus,  the  interaction  between  insider- 
outsider  mechanisms  and  firing  costs  exacerbates  the  unemployment 
problems  of a rigid economy  in the presence  of idiosyncratic uncertainty. 
Similar  consequences  obtain  in  the  Shapiro-Stiglitz  (1984) "shirking" 
model of efficiency-wage  determination.  The basic idea of this mechanism 
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pline. By raising wages  and causing unemployment,  firms increase work- 
ers' productivity because workers fear the risk of being "caught shirking" 
and sent back into the unemployment  pool. If at least partially this mecha- 
nism is indeed  at work in real rigid economies,  it should be clear that the 
presence  of firing regulations  worsens  the  unemployment  problem.  If 
firing a worker is more difficult, wages  in the primary sector have to be 
raised  even  more  in  order  to  increase  the  risk  of  joblessness.  Other 
efficiency-wage  arguments  lead,  however,  to different conclusions.  For 
example,  higher wages  may be granted to primary-sector workers as part 
of a "mutual exchange  of gifts,"  in which  workers'  sense  of "fairness" 
induces  more  effort on  their part (Akerlof,  1984). Job security  may  de- 
crease  the  efficiency-wage  premium  in this  case,  since  the  same  "gift" 
offered by the employer  may be constituted  by different combinations  of 
wage  increases  and protection from the risk of unemployment. 
4.  Back  to the  Evidence 
The model  of the previous  section was kept as simple as possible,  but it 
arguably  does  capture  the  economic  mechanics  of labor allocation  and 
compensation  under  different  labor-market institutions.  Many features 
of the U.S. labor market's institutional  structure appear more flexible, in 
the sense  of our model,  than their European counterparts.  The relative 
flexibility of the U.S.  labor market with respect to its European counter- 
part has been  questioned  by Allen  and Freeman (1994), who  point  out 
some  elements  of  greater  rigidity,  or perhaps  just  the  lack of  greater 
flexibility, in the recent evolution  of the U.S. labor market. As to Europe, 
there are indications  of increasing  flexibility in several countries  during 
the  last  decade,  and  in  Britain since  the  early  1980s  (see  Bertola and 
Ichino,  1995). Yet, Europe and the United States still have a long way  to 
go  before  the  former  becomes  more  flexible  than  the  latter  from  an 
institutional  point  of  view.  In this  section,  we  argue  that  the  perfor- 
mance  of U.S.  and  European  labor markets can at least qualitatively  be 
interpreted  in  light  of  our  stylized  model's  twin  solutions-which,  of 
course,  should  not be taken literally: the rigid model,  in particular, cer- 
tainly offers an extreme  and unrealistic picture of "rigidity," as even  in 
Europe workers are difficult but not impossible  to fire, quit with positive 
probability, and to some extent do move across occupations,  sectors, and 
regions. 
We first address  empirical issues  from a long-run  perspective,  focus- 
ing  on  the  steady-state  implications  of the class of models  we  consider 
for  mobility-cost-induced  wage  dispersion  and  for  equilibrium  (fric- 
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market  institutions  may  explain  the  divergent  reaction  of  U.S.  and 
European  labor markets to exogenous  developments  over the 1970s and 
1980s. 
4.1 INSTITUTIONS,  MOBILITY,  AND LABOR  INCOMES 
The model  of Section  3 is quite vague  as to what  might  be the real-life 
counterpart of its "firms." A geographic  interpretation is certainly possi- 
ble,  however,  and  may  throw  some  light  on  the  institutional  determi- 
nants  of the wage-dispersion  and regional-dynamics  evidence  reviewed 
in  Section  2.  The  relative  lack of  workers'  mobility  across  regions  in 
Europe  has  been  widely  documented.  At  least  during  the  1970s and 
1980s,  labor appears  scarcely mobile  even  within  each European  state, 
and certainly  less  mobile  than across American  states  (see,  e.g.,  OECD 
Employment Outlook, 1990,  p.  85).  Available  migration  data,  in  most 
cases,  lump  together  workers  and  out-of-the-labor-force  migrants,  and 
evidence  from  such  low-quality  data should  perhaps  be discounted  to 
some  extent.  Indirect evidence  on patterns of regional labor-market ad- 
justments  after a shock affords similar conclusions,  however: as is appar- 
ent  from  the  simple  indicators  considered  in  Section  2.2  above,  Euro- 
pean regional unemployment  rates regress much more slowly  to a com- 
mon  mean  (and fluctuate  much less  around each other) than their U.S. 
counterparts.  More careful empirical analyses  of migration,  labor-force, 
and employment  data suggest  that European workers would  rather exit 
from the  labor force or remain unemployed  than move  geographically 
after a negative  shock to local labor demand.13 
Of  course,  one  might  want  to  explain  regional  labor immobility  in 
Europe  by  exogenous  tastes  and  technology:  European workers  might 
be  inclined  to  stay  where  they  are rather than face the  relatively  high 
mobility  costs  imposed  by  sharply  differentiated  local  cultures  and 
strong  family ties.  These  features are certainly important,  especially  for 
understanding  why  labor mobility  should  be  even  lower  across  Euro- 
pean  national  borders  than  across regions  within  them.14 But mobility 
costs across regions  of each European nation,  however  high,  can hardly 
13. See,  for example,  Pissarides  and  McMaster (1990) on  Great Britain, Ichino  (1994) on 
Italy, Jimeno and Bentolila (1995) on Spain, and Decressin and Fatas (1994) for compara- 
tive evidence  on various countries. 
14. See Flanagan  (1993) and Eichengreen  (1993). Across the borders of European nations, 
in  fact,  purchasing-power-adjusted  wage  differentials  are actually larger than  across 
U.S.  states  (Erickson,  1993).  Since  there  is  as  yet  no  institutional  pressure  towards 
nominal-  or real-wage  equalization  across national borders within the European Union, 
such findings  could be interpreted along the lines of the "flexible" model of Section 3.1 
if the substantial  cultural differences  across European nationalities  (a large k) are con- 
trasted with  the more homogeneous  United States (where,  at least, the same language 
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explain  the  lack of mobility  at the  level  of geographical  disaggregation 
considered  in Figure 4 (regional units at the NUTS 3 level of the REGIO 
databank have average population  of less than a million, and their area is 
comparable to that of counties  in the United States). 
The model  of-Section 3 suggests  a different point of view on European 
regional  immobility.  In the  dynamic  equilibrium  of the flexible market, 
labor mobility  from  "bad" towards  "good"  firms  (or regions)  leads  to 
relative-wage  adjustments,  up to the point where labor mobility costs are 
just  consistent  with  wage  differentials.  In Europe,  on  the  other  hand, 
wage  equalization  is largely a result of centralized collective wage  settle- 
ments aimed at reducing wage differentials across regions.15  If wage equal- 
ity is institutionally  enforced,  only different employment  probabilities can 
provide  incentives  for individual  workers to move across regions.  In the 
"rigid" model of Section 3.2, wage compression  is combined with perpet- 
ual  job  security-which  reduces  turnover  to  (at most)  substitution  of 
voluntarily  retiring  workers,  and  essentially  wipes  out  incentives  for 
worker mobility. Reality is certainly less extreme than our simple model 
would make it, but, to the extent that wages are similar across regions and 
hiring  probabilities  are uniformly  low,  European  workers  do  not  have 
strong incentives  to move from a region hit by a negative  shock to a more 
fortunate area, and low worker mobility induces  high persistence  of un- 
employment  rates across European regions. 
Little reliable wage  information  is available for Europe at the regional 
level,  and  lack  of  individual  wage  datasets  makes  it very  difficult  to 
control for worker characteristics in geographic comparisons.16 Available 
U.S. data, however,  conform well to a geographical interpretation of the 
alternative,  "flexible" paradigm illustrated in Section 3-where  regional 
wage  differentials  persist  in  equilibrium  to  trigger  labor mobility  be- 
tween  regions  subject to idiosyncratic shocks.  Like Blanchard and Katz's 
(1992)  evidence  on  aggregate  state-level  wage  dynamics  (see  Section 
2.1),  Topel's  (1986) work  on  individual  worker  data  finds  that  wages 
initially  increase  in areas which  receive  positive  labor-demand  shocks. 
This  increase  attracts migration  flows  to  the  region,  and  this  process 
15. In Italy, for example,  removal  of nominal  wage  differences  ("gabbie salariali," or wage 
cages) was  and  still  is  an  explicit  goal  of  unions,  and  is  enforced  by  law  for most 
components  of  the  compensation  package.  Cost-of-living  adjustment  clauses  ("scala 
mobile")  always  specified  identical  nominal  wage  increases  for all regions  indepen- 
dently  of local differences  in inflation.  French minimum-wage  legislation  has much the 
same effect, namely  that of preventing  job characteristics from being reflected in wages 
(and wage  differentials). 
16. Jimeno  and  Bentolila  (1995),  using  national-income  accounting  data and  urban price 
indices,  do  find  that  labor  compensation  does  not  vary  across  Spanish  regions  in 
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continues  until wage  differentials  are arbitraged away, i.e,  they  are too 
small  to  offset  mobility  costs.  In fact,  for more  mobile  workers  (e.g., 
young  workers),  regional  wage  differentials  are largely  eliminated  by 
migration  inflows,  while  for less  mobile  workers  (e.g.,  older  workers) 
regional  wage  differentials  are not  fully  arbitraged away,  and  tend  to 
persist in equilibrium to compensate  their higher mobility costs.  Finally, 
for all workers,  Topel (1986) finds that larger differentials trigger mobility 
if shocks  are expected  to be less persistent. 
This evidence  is consistent  with the predictions  of models  in the class 
represented  by  the  "flexible" paradigm  of Section  3. We can also  con- 
sider other,  nongeographic  implications  of relative labor market "rigid- 
ity"  or  "flexibility" in  U.S.  and  European  evidence.  Even  within  the 
same  regional  unit,  of  course,  earnings  inequality  for observationally 
equivalent  workers is much  more pronounced  in the United States than 
in Europe.  From the  flexible model's  vantage  point,  this could  at least 
partly reflect reallocation-cost-induced  wage  differentials across sectors, 
plants,  or occupations,  or cross-classifications  according  to  these  and 
other job (rather than worker) characteristics. 
In a flexible market's dynamic equilibrium, in fact, point-in-time  wage 
heterogeneity  corresponds  to time-series fluctuations of labor income for 
individual  workers,  who  face wage  and  employment  uncertainty  as  a 
result of "firm"-level dynamic developments.  There is plentiful evidence 
that U.S.  workers  laid off by firms hit by negative  shocks indeed  suffer 
severe income  losses  and substantial periods of unemployment.17 This is 
qualitatively  consistent  with  the model  of Section 3, where workers em- 
ployed  in  highly  productive  firms  suffer  income  losses  if  a  negative 
shock to their employer's  labor demand  forces them to choose  between 
remaining  in the current job, at a lower wage,  or incurring the mobility 
cost entailed by the transitions towards more productive firms. In equilib- 
rium, both movers  and stayers earn lower labor income.  Symmetrically, 
the employees  of "bad" firms earn higher  wages,  without  bearing mobil- 
ity costs,  if their employer  receives  a positive  labor-demand  shock  and 
hence  pays  higher wages  both to his existing employees  and to the new 
ones  he attracts. 
Empirical work  on  U.S.  individual  wage  data does  not usually  try to 
assess  the  extent  to which  point-in-time  wage  dispersion  reflects high 
volatility  of individual  labor-income  profiles.  But the evidence  of Gott- 
schalk and Moffitt (1994) indicates  that a third to a half of historical U.S. 
wage  inequality  (and  of  its  recent  increase,  which  we  discuss  below) 
reflects longitudinal  instability of workers' labor income,  whether  at un- 
17. See,  for example,  Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993) and Farber (1993). 40 - BERTOLA  & ICHINO 
changed  jobs or upon  job changes,  rather than (or as well  as) different 
mean  earnings  for workers  with  different unobservable  characteristics. 
These  empirical estimates  imply  that our modeling  perspective  may in- 
deed  be  relevant  for a large portion  of U.S.  wage  inequality.  Unfortu- 
nately,  no European  longitudinal  data sets are suitable for comparative 
empirical work on such  issues.  Other well-known  and readily available 
evidence,  however,  is quite supportive  of the implications  of our "rigid" 
view  of Europe. In particular, the high incidence  of youth and long-term 
unemployment  in  Europe  is  qualitatively  consistent  with  situations 
where  turnover  is largely limited  to replacement  of retiring workers by 
young  ones,  who have been unemployed  since entering the labor market. 
Another  potentially  fruitful  direction  for  empirical  research  would 
build  on  the  work  and  data  of  Davis  and  Haltiwanger  (1991) and  on 
similar data  sets  for other  countries  where  larger and  more  profitable 
firms  are  found  to  pay  higher  wages  to  similar  workers.  Davis  and 
Haltiwanger  find  evidence  that  many  plant  characteristics  other  than 
size have  explanatory  power  for within-group  wage  inequality. In other 
words,  job characteristics  matter  for the  wages  of  otherwise  identical 
workers-and  this is what  models  of costly worker mobility across jobs 
could rationalize.  Firm-level wage  differentials certainly have more than 
one  explanation,  of  course,  but  it is interesting  to recognize  explicitly 
that size and profitability are not given once and for all in a static setting, 
but  vary  over  time:  inasmuch  as  mobility  towards  recently  improved 
firms  is  costly  for workers,  equilibrium  wage  (differentials)  may  offer 
dynamic  compensation  for such costs.  The evolution  of the distribution 
of plant size is indeed  found by Davis and Haltiwanger  to be associated 
with  the evolution  of the wage  structure, and it would  be very interest- 
ing  to obtain  comparable  evidence  from similar European  data sets  as 
they become  available. 
4.2 ONE EXPLANATION  FOR  U.S. AND EUROPEAN  DYNAMICS 
Extrapolating the long-run  comparative evidence  above, it is tempting to 
try and bring the stylized  theoretical analysis of Section 3 to bear on the 
recent evolution  of European and U.S. labor markets. If European work- 
ers  are  increasingly  jobless,  and  U.S.  workers  increasingly  penniless 
(Krugman,  1994),  can  these  phenomenon  be  interpreted  as  different 
"waves" caused  by a stone  falling in "lakes" whose  institutional  charac- 
teristics have long been  and largely remain quite different? 
From the  perspective  of the  stylized  models  of Section  3, increasing 
inequality  and  increasing  unemployment  can  indeed  be  viewed  as 
"more  of  the  same"  for  each  labor  market: if  U.S.  within-skill  wage 
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frictional in nature),  then  exogenous  developments  can explain  higher 
inequality  if  they  make  mobility  issues  more  relevant  to  the  flexible 
market's  equilibrium;  if European  institutions  force wage  equalization 
and  low  mobility,  then  the  persistent  unemployment  resulting  from 
noncompetitive  wage-setting  practices may be increased  by exogenous 
developments  which  magnify  the  efficiency  and  labor-demand  effects 
of job-security  provisions. 
Our  framework  of  analysis  suggests  that  a  simple  and  plausible 
change  in  the  economic  environment  may  be  responsible  for  more 
sharply divergent  outcomes  in "flexible" and "rigid" (but otherwise  simi- 
lar) labor markets: increased  instability, as indexed  by the frequency p of 
labor-demand  shocks,  enhances  the  relevance  of  the  dynamic  aspects 
analyzed  in Section  3-or,  as Allen  and Freeman (1994) put it, "makes 
flexibility a more important  determinant  of outcomes  than in the past." 
Allen  and Freeman dismiss  this explanation  and,  without  developing  a 
formal model,  lean towards institutional changes leading to more flexibil- 
ity in Europe and less flexibility in the United States as potential explana- 
tions  of the  evidence.  In the  simple  models  of Section 3, however,  the 
effects  of  higher  uncertainty  on  labor-market outcomes  are strikingly 
consistent  with  the evidence.  A higher p requires more wage  inequality 
across  standardized  labor  units  in  the  equilibrium  of  a model  where 
wage  differentials  finance  costly  labor reallocation  (Figure 5), as larger 
immediate  gains  are  needed  to  induce  labor mobility  when  they  are 
more likely to disappear  in the near future: this may well rationalize the 
increasing  within-skill  U.S.  wage  inequality  documented  in  Section  2 
above.  Symmetrically, we  see in Figure 6 that a higher p reduces  steady- 
state employment  for any given  (rigid) wage  level,  as higher instability 
of notional  labor demand  gives more weight  to future negative  shocks in 
optimal  forward-looking  labor  demand  policy:  for  any  given  wage, 
higher  volatility  is  consistent  with  higher  levels  of  wait  (rather than 
frictional)  unemployment  among  new  entrants  and  at  the  aggregate 
level. 
These  theoretical results match the parallel developments  of U.S. and 
European labor markets, suggesting  that increasing volatility of labor de- 
mand over the last two decades  may be the common  cause of diverging 
developments  of institutionally  different labor markets across the Atlan- 
tic. By saying  so,  of course,  we  may well be giving  a fancy name to our 
ignorance,  since forcing processes  and their volatility are not easy to iden- 
tify and measure.  However,  it is reasonable to suppose  that the intensity 
of reallocation-inducing  shocks  has been  strongly  correlated across the 
Atlantic throughout  the 1970s and 1980s, given the similar technological 
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linkages between  their economies.  The end of the postwar reconstruction 
period,  the demise  of the Bretton Woods system  of fixed exchange  rates, 
changes  in the structure of raw-material markets, and erratic and poorly 
coordinated  macroeconomic  policies  all  arguably  destabilized  labor- 
market forcing  processes,  along  with  increasing  openness  to trade and 
technological  progress-i.e.,  with the structural changes invoked by con- 
ventional  skill-based  theories  of wage  determination. 
If (potential)  "reallocation energy"  did increase  in the recent past,  it 
had  to be  conserved  in equilibrium,  and its outlet  may very well  have 
been  different  in  different  institutional  environments.  A  more  volatile 
environment  requires larger wage  differentials  across identical workers 
in a flexible  labor market,  as the  expectation  of higher  wages  compen- 
sates the movers  for mobility costs incurred when  leaving firms (sectors, 
regions)  hit by  negative  shocks  to reach firms (sectors,  regions)  hit by 
positive  ones.  In a rigid economy,  conversely,  a more volatile  environ- 
ment  induces  more  caution  in hiring and,  for a given  wage,  leads  to a 
higher overall rate of unemployment.  The dynamic perspective  we pro- 
pose  can  arguably  explain  a portion  (though  certainly  not  all) of  the 
observed  evolution  of U.S.  wages  and European unemployment  rates. 
The  remainder  of  this  section  lays  out  and  discusses  some  of  its  less 
obvious  empirical implications,  which  have not attracted as much atten- 
tion as the motivating  facts of Section 2. 
4.2.1  Wage  Instability  A crucial and unambiguous  empirical implication 
of models  where  wage  differentials  reflect worker mobility costs  is that 
higher idiosyncratic  labor-demand volatility should have led to more un- 
stable labor-income  profiles in the U.S. labor market, especially  for older 
and/or less  mobile  workers.  Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994) find not only 
that a substantial  portion of cross-sectional  wage  inequality at a point in 
time indeed  is explained by within-individual  dynamics,  but also that the 
"transitory" (almost  i.i.d.)  and  "permanent" components  of individual 
wage  differentials  have both widened  in the 1980s, and for "movers" as 
well as for "stayers"-which,  as noted above, is quite consistent  with the 
flexible  model's  theoretical  implications  in  the  face  of  higher  labor- 
demand  volatility. Further relevant empirical work should perhaps try to 
discriminate  between  an essentially  static view  of wage  determination, 
where  wage  heterogeneity  increases  only  if  an  individual's  skills  are 
priced differently  once time variation  is removed,  and the dynamic perspec- 
tive we propose-where  cross-sectional  inequality would increase even if 
all relevant  conceivable  worker  characteristics were  appropriately  con- 
trolled for, as a result of greater time-series  instability of a given individ- 
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Real-life datasets, unfortunately, feature a changing collection of intrinsi- 
cally heterogeneous  workers in perpetually changing labor markets, and 
make it difficult to evaluate an individual's ceteris  paribus  earning potential. 
Inasmuch as higher volatility of one's future outlook makes inaction more 
attractive, the basic qualitative message  of our model's  "flexible" equilib- 
rium would  presumably be valid in realistic models which allow for entry 
and  exit  of  workers  and  firms in  nonstationary  technological  environ- 
ments.  Without a complete  specification  of forcing processes'  dynamics, 
however,  it is hard to see how long-run (static) and temporary (dynamic) 
components  might be best disentangled  from raw levels  and changes  of 
individual  wages.  In their work, Gottschalk and Moffitt find that tempo- 
rary wage movements  have become increasingly pronounced around both 
moving-average  and  random-walk  estimates  of an individual's  earning 
potential.  Further research along  these  lines  may well  confirm that dy- 
namic features are an important component  of U.S. inequality trends. 
4.2.2  Job-Based  and Geographic  Effects  Of course, not all wage-dispersion 
phenomena  may be appropriately  explained  by our theoretical perspec- 
tive.  People  do  not  usually  choose  or change  their  sex  for  economic 
reasons;  hence  gender  earning  gaps  cannot  be  rationalized  by  adjust- 
ment  costs  and  forward-looking  worker  behavior  (and  male-female 
wage  differentials  are probably the only  decreasing  ones  in recent U.S. 
experience;  see,  e.g.,  Katz and Murphy,  1992). To the extent  that one's 
education  level can be (at a cost) chosen  or changed,  conversely, increas- 
ing  education  premia  might  be  partly explained  by higher  uncertainty 
about future employment  prospects.  Of course, however,  the most natu- 
ral interpretation  of a mobility-cost-based  view  of wage  differentials is a 
geographical  one.  Accordingly,  we  reconsider  the  evidence  in  this  re- 
spect,  with  an eye  to assessing  whether  the recent evolution  of regional 
wage  differentials  and unemployment  persistence  is consistent  with in- 
creased forcing-process  instability. 
Figure  7  illustrates  the  evolution  of  geographic  wage  differentials 
across American  states.  Panel (a) plots the coefficient of variation of raw 
manufacturing  wages:  regional  wage  inequality  decreased  in the  1970s 
(probably reflecting geographic  variation of supply  and demand  factors, 
which  are  not  controlled  for  in  this  figure),  but  has  increased  very 
strongly  since  1980.18 The evidence  displayed  in panel  (b), which  con- 
18. The  1970s evidence  is  consistent  with  long-term  trends  towards  convergence  of per 
capita incomes  across  U.S.  states,  documented  by Barro and  Sala-i-Martin (1991). A 
long-term perspective,  however,  hides the remarkable fact that, in the 1980s, U.S. wage 
dispersion  increased  along  the regional  dimension  as well  as along those  emphasized 
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Fig.7A:  Hourly  wages,  manufacturing  Fig.7B:  Residual  hourly  wages,  manufacturing 
Notes:  (a) Coefficient  of variation  of BLS  establishment-based  average  hourly 
earnings of manufacturing  production  workers. (b) Population-weighted 
standard  deviation of state-specific  residual  means from cross-sectional 
regression of CPS log hourly wages on an experience  polynomial  and a variety 
of controls. For details and sources, see Blanchard  and Katz  (1992). 
trols for individual  characteristics and is only available for the 1979-1990 
period,  is  more  directly  relevant  to  our  point.  Similar workers'  wage 
dispersion  increases  strongly across U.S. states, supporting  a geographi- 
cal interpretation  of  the  "flexible" model's  implications  in  the  face  of 
higher  labor-demand  instability.  Rigid  European  labor  markets,  con- 
versely,  display  patterns  of constant  or declining  regional wage  disper- 
sion over the 1980s (see OECD Employment  Outlook, 1990, p.89). 
Europe,  once  again,  lacks  reliable  wage  information.  Indications  of 
higher  instability  may, however,  be found  in the  evolution  of regional 
unemployment  persistence:  even  in a "rigid" market,  if not  in the  ex- 
treme characterization  of Section 3.2,  labor does  move  towards  regions 
where  unemployment  is relatively  low.  If the identity  of these  regions 
changes  more frequently  over time,  then migration flows  change  direc- 
tion more often and we  should  observe  less persistence  (stronger mean 
reversion)  of  regional  unemployment  rates.  Similar reasoning  applies, 
even  more clearly, to a "flexible" equilibrium with  frictional unemploy- 
ment  in  the  sending  and  receiving  regions.  Table 2  reports  statistics 
similar to those  of Table 1, for two  subperiods.  These  short data series 
may not contain much information,  of course. Taken at face value,  how- 
ever,  the  simple  statistics  of  Table 2 conform  to  what  the  theoretical 
models  of Section  3 would  predict in response  to higher volatility: both 
in the relatively  "flexible" U.S. and in the more "rigid" European econo- 
mies,  unemployment  appears less geographically  persistent  in the more 
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Table 2  EVIDENCE OF INCREASING 
REGIONAL TURBULENCE 
Coefficient 
Country  1983-1987a  1988-1992a 
U.S.  -.50  -.70 
(.12)  (.06) 
Great Britain  -.01  -.47 
(.05)  (.05) 
France  .04  -.07 
(.06)  (.05) 
Italy  .36  -.11 
(.08)  (.04) 
aFor  the United States  the periods  are 1982-1986  and 1987- 
1991. 
Note: Coefficients of OLS cross-sectional  regressions for 
each country  and for each subperiod.  Regional  units as in 
Table  1. The dependent variable  is the variation  of the un- 
employment  rate, and the coefficient  shown is that of the 
initial  unemployment  rate  (standard  errors  in parentheses). 
The constant (not shown) absorbs  the effects of aggregate 
unemployment  changes. 
4.2.3  On Quantity-Based  Volatility Measures  Other  pieces  of evidence  on 
the  recent  evolution  of  U.S.  labor  markets  are  only  apparently  inconsis- 
tent  with  our  dynamic  interpretation  of wage  inequality.  Allen  and  Free- 
man  (1994)  note  that,  in the  1960s,  "unemployment  rates  in the  U.S.  were 
between  5 and  6%-two  to three  times  larger  than  unemployment  rates  in 
Europe,  which  ran  between  1 and  2%,"  and  they  use  more  recent  evi- 
dence  to argue  that  labor-market  flexibility  has  not  increased  in the  recent 
U.S.  experience  despite  the  increased  importance  of  trade-induced 
shocks  (and,  we  may  add,  the  wide  swings  of  U.S.  real  exchange  rates 
during  the  1970s  and  1980s).  However,  the  stylized  model  outlined  in 
Section  3 tells  us  that  nothing  prevents  a rigid  system  from  delivering  full 
employment  if wages  are set low  enough  (though  even  in this  case  work- 
ers  would  be  inefficiently  allocated  across  production  sites):  if  there  is 
unemployment  in  a rigid  labor  market,  it  is  persistent  rather  than  fric- 
tional,  and  it may  be  either  higher  or lower  than  in an  otherwise  similar 
flexible  system.  Institutions  do  change  over  time,  of course,  but  it is not 
necessary  to  invoke  such  changes  to  rationalize  the  U.S.  and  European 
unemployment  experience  from  the  1960s  to  the  present:  even  in  the 
absence  of  institutional  changes,  increased  idiosyncratic  uncertainty  (as 
in Figure  6) and  insider  wage  pressure  in rigid  European  economies  may 
explain  the  observed  reversal  of  the  unemployment-rate  ranking  of  the 
two  systems. 46 *  BERTOLA  & ICHINO 
Another  lesson  of Section 3's simple models  is that it may be mislead- 
ing  to try to use  quantity  indicators  to assess  the relevance  of idiosyn- 
cratic shocks  in a "flexible" market, where  wage  differentials spur costly 
labor mobility. As the bottom panel of Figure 5 illustrates, a more volatile 
environment  (as indexed  by an increase  of the frequency  p of idiosyn- 
cratic labor-demand  shocks)  need  not cause  more labor reallocation per 
unit  time  or  higher  frictional  unemployment:  in  our  stylized  model, 
when  labor is  reallocated  more  frequently  out  of  or into  a given firm 
(region,  sector) then fewer labor units actually move  upon  realization of 
a  shock.  As  the  potential  for reallocation  increases  with  p, but  actual 
reallocation  is  discouraged  by  the  same  increase  in volatility, both  the 
incidence  of mobility  on  a given worker  and  the  overall unemployment 
rate are  ambiguously  affected  by  higher  volatility.  Thus,  the  mild  in- 
crease of overall U.S.  unemployment  is quite consistent  with  increased 
idiosyncratic  uncertainty  if the  flexible  market equilibria are located  in 
the  flat portion  of  the  "unemployment  Laffer curve" illustrated  in  the 
bottom  panel  of Figure 5 (or if p drifts up from about 22% to about 28% 
for the parameters of the figure). 
In  our  steady-state  model,  an  individual  worker's  average  tenure 
length  is inversely  related to aggregate  unemployment:  hence,  the evi- 
dence  in  Allen  and  Freeman  (1994), Farber (1995), and  Diebold,  Neu- 
mark, and Polski (1995) that "lifetime jobs are not disappearing"  in the 
U.S.  is similarly  far from being  inconsistent  with  higher  labor-demand 
variability. These  empirical  findings  are not  uncontroversial  (see,  e.g., 
Gottschalk  and  Moffitt,  1994), and  such  supply-side  phenomena  as in- 
creasing  female  attachment  to labor-force participation may partly hide 
the effects  of greater uncertainty  on the demand  side.  But conceptually 
straightforward  extensions  of the "flexible" labor-market model  may ra- 
tionalize  other composition  effects.  Farber (1995) finds  that young  men 
are substantially  less likely to be in long-term jobs today than they were 
twenty  years ago, while the opposite  is true for older workers, and this is 
consistent  with  models  of  equilibrium  labor mobility  where  the  likeli- 
hood  of exit from the market is an increasing  function  of age: as a fixed 
cost  discourages  mobility  more  strongly  for workers  whose  horizon  is 
shorter, the distribution  of unemployment  and short-tenure jobs should 
be skewed  towards  shorter labor-market ages, possibly  more strongly so 
for higher volatility of labor demand. 
5.  Conclusions 
This  paper's  interpretation  of  U.S.  and  European  unemployment  and 
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ized  representation  of standard labor-market models  and is fully consis- 
tent with  the common  view  that labor-market flexibility (or lack thereof) 
has  become  an  increasingly  important  determinant  of  market  perfor- 
mance  in  the  last  two  decades.  We certainly  do  not  deny  that biased 
technological  progress  or increased  competition  from developing  coun- 
tries  worsened  the  wage  and  employment  opportunities  of  low-skill 
workers  in industrial  countries; nor do we  dismiss  the obvious  effect of 
high real wages  and low aggregate demand  on the aggregate unemploy- 
ment  rate of  heavily  unionized,  inflation-fighting  European  countries. 
We emphasize,  however,  that higher labor-demand  volatility may have 
contributed  to increase within-skill  wage  dispersion  in the United States 
and unemployment  in Europe,  through  dynamic adjustment  in laissez- 
faire  markets  and  forward-looking  behavior  by  employers  in  heavily 
regulated  markets. 
This perspective  on  labor-market issues  suggests  potentially  fruitful 
directions for further empirical and theoretical research. The simple mod- 
els  discussed  above  are  not  meant  to  be  fully  realistic  and  could  be 
complicated  in a number of directions for empirical purposes.  In particu- 
lar, steady-state  solutions  conveniently  eliminate  aggregate  dynamics, 
but,  of course,  the static and dynamic  structure of industrial economies 
changes  continuously  and  gradually  over  time.  Transitional dynamics 
are important  in reality, and,  like the rest of the  simple  models  above, 
the steady-state  assumption  is not meant to be taken literally. In particu- 
lar, European employment  and wages  were presumably biased upwards 
in  the  1970s,  when  elements  of  "rigidity" were  introduced  and  pre- 
vented  labor  shedding,  while  the  employment  performance  of  many 
European  economies  appears particularly weak as institutional  steps  to- 
wards increased  flexibility are taken in the 1980s and 1990s (Bertola and 
Ichino,  1995). 
The deeper  determinants  of labor markets' institutional structures also 
deserve  to be studied  in future work.  Like Dr. Jekyll, the stylized  model 
of  Section  3  has  a  double  personality:  given  plausible  differences  in 
wage-setting  and job-security  institutions,  it can explain different labor- 
market outcomes  for technologically  identical economies  faced by similar 
changes  in exogenous  uncertainty.  The competitive  nature of a flexible 
market's equilibrium  implies  that the resulting  allocation is constrained 
efficient,  as the mobility decisions  induced by equilibrium wage differen- 
tials appropriately  maximize  the  total surplus  produced  in the market, 
net  of mobility  costs:  thus,  the rigid personality  of the model  is unam- 
biguously  Mr. Hyde  if the model is solved,  as we do, under the assump- 
tion  of risk neutrality.  Our entire analysis  is based  on the premise  that 
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exception  of the  post-Thatcher  British experience,  this  premise  is con- 
firmed by many  empirical indicators.  It is then  natural to wonder  why 
European  governments  would  choose  to decrease  their economies'  pro- 
ductive  efficiency. 
It may  be  possible  to  answer  this  question  by  considering  that,  if 
individuals  are risk-averse,  then  maximization  of aggregate  production 
would  still be  an  appropriate  social  objective  only  if financial markets 
and/or fiscal instruments  made it possible  to redistribute the production 
"pie" across individuals.  But perfect financial markets would  also allow 
market participants to specify appropriate (contingent)  side payments  so 
as to work around those regulations  that hamper productive efficiency- 
for example,  employers  could  offer bonuses  to  redundant  employees 
and  induce  them  to  search  for alternative  employment  opportunities 
rather than remain idly employed  in their current jobs; or unemployed 
individuals  could  "buy" state-contingent  jobs from prospective  employ- 
ers who  fear future firing constraints  (Lazear, 1990). The implications  of 
labor-market institutions  are more interesting  and less clear-cut if insur- 
ance against labor-income  risk is ruled out in light of realistic imperfect- 
information  and contract implementation  problems,  which  also prevent 
financial markets from undoing  the effects of regulations.  Existing mar- 
kets  clearly  provide  incomplete  hedging  opportunities  against  labor- 
income  risk,19 and  intertemporal  contingent  contracts (especially  those 
meant  to circumvent  regulation)  are hardly enforceable  in labor courts. 
Thus,  the welfare  of risk-averse uninsured  workers can be decreased 
ex ante  by  the  same  labor-income  volatility  that allows  a flexible labor 
market  to  respond  ex  post  quickly, if not  costlessly,  to exogenous  de- 
mand  and  productivity  developments.  Inasmuch  as  a  "rigid" market 
structure can have desirable labor-income stabilization effects,  continen- 
tal European  institutions  may  well  be  inspired  by  a desire  to  shelter 
individual  workers'  welfare  from  idiosyncratic  shocks,  at  the  cost  of 
dynamic  inefficiencies  in labor allocation.  This perspective  on European 
rigidities  is  complementary  to that of Burda and  Mertens  (1994), who 
discuss  European  wage-setting  institutions  in  the  standard  efficient- 
contracts  framework:  if workers  are immobile  for exogenous  reasons, 
implicit or explicit wage contracts should optimally compress wage differ- 
entials; we  assume  exogenously  compressed  wages,  and argue that this 
may contribute  to lower  worker mobility. Future research should  try to 
model  the  tradeoff  between  desirable  and  undesirable  effects  of labor- 
19. In the United  States,  in fact, consumption  inequality  has increased roughly in parallel 
with  labor-income  inequality,  and  poor  people,  in particular, appear  to reduce  their 
consumption  in response  to decreased  labor income  (Cutler and Katz, 1992)-as  they 
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market rigidity, and  evaluate  the  possibility  that its position  and  slope 
may  have  been  changed  by technological  developments  and/or insider 
wage-setting  mechanisms.  If generalized  instability  has  increased  the 
returns  to  flexibility,  as  the  wage  and  unemployment  evidence  would 
indicate,  then rigid European institutions  may have become too costly in 
terms of efficiency.  Still, it is quite possible  that a unified  Europe should 
choose  a common  institutional  framework  that,  while  less  rigid  than 
previously,  does  not reach the American  or British degree  of flexibility. 
To the  extent  that  they  do  not  result  in  across-the-board  wage  in- 
creases,  aggregate  demand  policies  might  alleviate  the  unemployment 
consequences  of labor market rigidities in Europe, although  they would 
not reduce  the inefficiencies  due to the lack of labor-market reallocation 
in the  presence  of idiosyncratic  shocks.  As  to the  United  States,  if the 
volatility  of idiosyncratic  shocks  can be blamed  for at least  part of the 
observed  wage  inequality,  then  measures  aimed  at  reducing  labor- 
demand  volatility  might  help  eliminate  a possibly  important  source  of 
wage  inequality  without  costs  in  unemployment-whether  moving 
along the efficiency-insurance  frontier, or shifting it. 
Appendix  A.  Equilibrium  Wage  Differentials  under  Costly 
Labor  Mobility 
Worker j's  mobility  choices  must  be  such  as to maximize  the  expected 
present  value  of labor income  net of mobility costs between  the present 
time t and the (random) time T when  he leaves  the market: 
maxEt [(wt  - 
mk)(  )  r)]  =maxEt [(t w  - 
mtk)D-  =Wt,  (Al) 
where  D  /[(  +  )]  1;  (if  worker  i=0s  employed  in a 
where  D  -  1/[(1 +  r)(1 +  /5)]  1; &t =  wc (if worker j is employed  in a 
good  firm at time t) or wB (if employed  in a bad firm at time t); and mt =  1 
if worker j moves  at time t, or 0 otherwise. 
In a steady-state  equilibrium of our model,  wc and wB are constant over 
time,  and  the  present  discounted  value  of worker j's labor income  de- 
pends  on  a single  state  variable-namely,  the  productivity  of his  em- 
ployer  at the  beginning  of the period,  as indexed  by  ac: this takes two 
possible  values,  switching  from one to the other with probability p, and 
so does  the value of problem (Al).  Denoting  Wt =  WG  ifj is employed  by 
a good  firm at  t,  and  Wt =  WB  if j  is  employed  by  a bad  firm at the 
beginning  of period  t, we have from (Al)  the recursive relationships 
WG =  WG +  D[(1 
-  p)WG  +  pWB]  (A2) 50 *  BERTOLA  & ICHINO 
and 
r  wb  +  D[pWG  +  (1 -  p)WB]  if  m' = 0, 
WB=  (A3) 
w  -  k +  D[(1 -  p)W  + pWB]  if  m  =  1. 
If mobility  does  take place in equilibrium,  the expressions  on the right- 
hand side of the second  relationship  in (A3) must be equal to each other: 
hence, 
WB =  WG 
k 
D(1 -  2p) 
=WG  -k(1  +  r)(1  +  )  ()  =  WG -  .\  (A4)  1 -  2p 
Inserting  the condition  (A4) in (A2) and (A3), and solving,  one  obtains 
(6) in  the  main  text.  If k is  too  large  (in  light  of  wage  volatility  and 
discount  rates) to ever induce  low-wage  employees  to move,  then labor 
allocation  is  history-dependent  in  steady  state,  and  (A4) holds  as  an 
upper bound  rather than with equality. 
In the linear case,  we  have 
aG _  wG  aB  -  wB 
ItG  =  B  p  (A5)  ?  t 
if firms  equate  wages  and  marginal  revenue  products.  Under  the  hy- 
pothesis  in  the  main  text,  that  workers  remain  unemployed  for  one 
period  when  changing  employers,  for (7) to hold  wages  must be given 
by 
w =  (1  +  p)(aC -  +  (1  -  p)aB 
2 
=z  +  (aG -  -  aB) -  (A6) 
2  2' 
wc  =  w  +  I 
=  z  +  (aG  -  -  aB)  +  - 
2  2 
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IG  =  L +  (PaG -  a  G 
, 
21+  (A7) 
1B=  L-  P(aG-aB-  _ 
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Appendix  B. Optimal  Labor  Demand  in a Rigid  Labor 
Market 
The solution  for the general case where  labor attrition is positive  (6 >  0) 
is conceptually  straightforward,  but analytically complex.  If 6 >  0, how- 
ever,  solution  is easy.  Let Vt denote  the  marginal value  of a labor unit 
employed  by  firm j  at  time  t,  i.e.,  the  expected  present  value  of  the 
difference  between  the  marginal  employees'  contribution  to the  firm's 
revenues  and the wage  rate: 
V t  (  1  (  - 3lt  -  w).  (B1) 
In the  steady  state we  consider,  employment  is stable at every  firm, 
and  the  marginal  value  of labor only  depends  on  each firm's business 
conditions  index:  denoting  V  f  =  VG if  ajt =  aG, V{ =  V  if  a?  =  aB,  and 
recalling the Markovian behavior of {(a},  we can write from (B1) 
VG = aG  _p/[  W +  [(1  -  p)VG +  pVB],  1 +  r  (B2) 
1 
VB =  aB -  13 -  w  +  [(1  -  p)VB +  pVC].  l+r 
The  hiring  policy  of  the  firm  is  straightforwardly  described.  With 
costless  hiring,  the marginal value  of employment  at each "good" firm 
must  be  zero,  for  with  38  >  0  a  positive  marginal  value  should  be 
arbitraged  away  by  further  hiring  (from  the  unemployment  pool,  or 
from other firms), and in steady  state a negative  value could only result 
from suboptimal  hiring decisions  in the past.  Given that firing costs are 
prohibitive,  however,  the marginal value  of labor can become  negative, 
and the firm should  take that into account when  evaluating  the forward- 
looking  expression  (B1) at  times  when  it  considers  hiring  additional 
employees. 
Inserting  VG =  0 in (B2) and  solving  for endogenous  variables yields 52 *  BERTOLA & ICHINO 
=  -  0  (  VB =  (aB -  aG)<  O  (B3) 
2p  +  r 
(the  marginal  value  of labor  is negative  for "bad" firms,  which  would  fire 
if that  were  allowed)  and  (8) in  the  main  text. 
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Comment 
KEVIN  MURPHY 
University  of Chicago 
The two issues  addressed  by Bertola and Ichino-widening  wage  differ- 
entials  in the United  States and increasing  unemployment  in Europe- 
are undoubtedly  two of the most important labor-market phenomena  of 
recent decades.  Since both trends  are possible  symptoms  of changes  in 
the structure of labor demand,  it seems  natural to try, as do Bertola and 
Ichino, to find a common  demand-side  explanation for these two trends. 
The basic  explanation  they  put  forth is that greater instability  in local 
labor  demand  (in  the  sense  of  less  persistence  of  relative  demand 
shocks)  generates  higher  equilibrium  levels  of wage  differentials  in the 
United  States,  where  wages  adjust to allocate labor across areas in the 
presence  of  costly  mobility.  In Europe  the  decrease  in  persistence  re- 
duces  the hiring of labor by currently high-demand  firms, since institu- 
tional  restrictions  on  employment  reductions  will  prevent  these  firms 
from shedding  labor when  their labor demand  declines. 
The notion  that common  forces are driving the recent changes  in the 
United  States  and  Europe  is  extremely  attractive.  The  fundamental 
demand-side  forces of technical change and changes in the world market 
are likely to be similar on both sides of the Atlantic. Likewise,  differences 
in the institutional  structures of the U.S. and European economies  seem 
like the most likely explanation for the observed contrasts in labor-market 
outcomes.  While I am convinced  by the basic structure of their analysis,  I 
am less  convinced  that the particular structural changes  or institutional 
factors that the  authors  emphasize  are the most  important  reasons  for 
what we  have witnessed  in the U.S. and European labor markets. 
Evidence  on  wages  and  employment  for the  United  States  suggests 
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that the rapid growth  in wage  inequality  over the past two decades  has 
resulted  from  substantial  growth  in  the  relative  demand  for  skilled 
workers,  or equivalently  a  substantial  decline  in  the  relative  demand 
for low-skilled  workers  (see  Katz and Murphy, 1992, or Juhn, Murphy, 
and  Pierce,  1993  in  the  reference  section  above).  Widening  wage 
premia  for more  skilled  workers  in the face of a rising supply  of more 
educated  and  more  skilled  workers  over  this  time  period,  as  well  as 
more direct evidence  on changes  in the occupation  and industrial distri- 
butions  of  employment,  suggest  a substantial  rise  in  skill demand  in 
the  United  States.  The authors  pick up  on  a piece  of this  evidence  by 
pointing  out that inequality  within  education  and experience  categories 
and  inequality  in  individual  wages  over  time  have  increased  as  well. 
They  interpret  this  evidence  of  increased  individual  and  individual- 
time  specific  variation  in wages  as evidence  that the volatility  of labor 
demand  has  increased.  A  key  element  in  their  interpretation  of  this 
evidence  is that wage  variation across individuals  within  skill categories 
and wage  variation  over time for individuals  represent  variation in the 
market value  of fixed bundles  of skills (i.e.,  something  that must reflect 
short-run limitations  on wage  arbitrage across markets). 
One  must  keep  in mind  that the evidence  on wage  inequality  within 
skill categories looks at only very crude measures  of skill such as years of 
education  and  years  of  potential  labor-market  experience.  Taken  to- 
gether,  these  and  other  "human  capital" variables  explain  only  about 
30% of the variation in individual  wages.  For example,  using  data from 
the March Current Population  Survey, I find that the overall variance in 
the  natural  logarithm  of  wages  for a sample  of  working  males  in  the 
United  States  in  1991-1992  was  0.32,  while  the  variance  of  the  wage 
residuals  from a standard human-capital  earnings  equation  (controlling 
for education,  experience,  marital status,  SMSA,  and  central-city resi- 
dence  and region)  for this sample  was 0.22. This is a very large amount 
of residual  variation.  A variance of 0.22 implies  a standard deviation  of 
individual  wages  within  skill groups  of 0.48. To get a feel for the magni- 
tude  of  the  variation  in  individual  wages  it is  useful  to  note  that  the 
cross-sectional  return  to  a year  of  education  in  1991-1992  was  about 
0.08,  while  the  standard  deviation  of individual  log  wage  residuals  is 
about 0.48 (equal to the return to 6 years of schooling).  This implies that 
if one randomly  chose  two individuals  with different levels of schooling, 
one would  have  to compare someone  having  18 years of schooling  with 
someone  having  just a first-grade education  to be 95% certain that the 
person with more schooling  actually had a higher hourly wage  (i.e.,  0.08 
x  17 =  1.36 and 0.48  x  1.96 x  1.41 =  1.33). Given the crudeness  of the 
standard  controls  and  the  enormous  magnitude  of  the  residual  wage 56  MURPHY 
variation,  it seems  likely  to me  that the bulk of the  observed  residual 
wage  variation  represents  the  return to unmeasured  attributes of indi- 
viduals  and jobs and not transitory variation in market prices generated 
by fluctuating labor demand.  In my opinion the increase in within-group 
variation is generated by the same forces leading to greater wage inequal- 
ity across groups  (i.e.,  the general  growth  in the demand  for skill) and 
not by growth  in the volatility of labor demand. 
This does  not limit the usefulness  of the authors' model or their over- 
all approach.  The model they develop  to analyze the impact of increased 
volatility  could  have been  used  to address  the question  of how  the U.S. 
and  European  labor markets  would  have  responded  to growth  in the 
demand  for skill. My suspicion  is that the implications would  have been 
quite similar to what they predict using their current structure and quite 
similar to what  we  have  observed,  but it would  be  nice  to  see  if they 
could tease  out some  way to evaluate  whether  growing  skill demand  or 
increased  volatility is the key element  (more on this later). 
On  the  institutional  side,  the  authors  model  the United  States as an 
unregulated  market  with  costly  mobility  and  stress  both  institutional 
wage  setting  and limits on layoffs  as the key elements  of the European 
markets.  Taking the United  States as the competitive  benchmark seems 
sensible.  A  more  interesting  question  is  whether  it is  the  centralized 
wage  setting  (which  will  generate  unemployment  when  wages  are not 
set  appropriately)  or  the  limits  on  mobility  that  generate  the  U.S.- 
European  contrast.  For example,  it is clear that simply  having  institu- 
tions  that  limit  the  downward  adjustment  of  wages  would  generate 
unemployment  for marginal labor-force groups in Europe in response  to 
a  skill  demand  shock,  even  without  increased  volatility.  The  need  to 
consider  the  restrictions  on  mobility  stems  from the authors'  desire  to 
explain  why  a  decreased  persistence  of  shocks  alone  would  lead  to 
higher  unemployment.  While  limits  on  mobility  may be an important 
aspect of the European labor market, it seems to me that they may not be 
essential  to understanding  the European unemployment  crisis, provided 
we  consider  the  primary labor-market shock as one  to the  demand  for 
the  less  skilled  rather than  simply  an increase  in  the  volatility  of  de- 
mand.  A skill-demand  shock with  rigid wages  provides  a direct impact 
on employment  without  the need  to appeal to limits on mobility. 
The  authors  are also interested  in explaining  other features  of Euro- 
pean  labor markets,  such  as why  there is little mobility in response  to 
relative  demand  shocks  across  areas and  why  unemployment  is  high 
among  high-skill  groups  in Europe. The first of these  questions  I think 
remains  a  puzzle.  Their explanation  is  that  the  institutional  rigidities 
lead to wage  compression  across areas and hence reduce the incentive  to Comment  *  57 
migrate.  However,  by preventing  wage  adjustments,  these  same  wage 
rigidities  generate  greater  employment  variations  across  regions  and 
would  therefore  tend  to increase  the  incentive  to  migrate  to other  re- 
gions  where  the  expected  duration  of  unemployment  would  be  less. 
Hence,  while  wage  differentials  across  regions  will  be  small,  employ- 
ment differentials will not be so, and there may actually be a greater and 
not a lesser incentive  to migrate. In fact my guess  is that the durations of 
unemployment  vary  greatly  across  areas within  Europe  and  therefore 
that any  calculation  of the economic  incentive  to migrate would  prove 
those  incentives  to be high and not low. 
The  growth  in  unemployment  for high-skilled  workers  in  Europe  I 
think fits quite nicely  with  the facts for the United  States and the pres- 
ence of wage rigidities. Again, in the United States we have seen changes 
in labor demand  that have reduced wages  for less-skilled  groups relative 
to wages  for high-skilled  groups  and reduced wages  for the least skilled 
within  each  group  relative  to  the  most  skilled.  If institutions  limit the 
ability of wages  to adjust for different  individuals  within  these  groups 
just as they limit the ability of wages  to adjust across groups,  then some 
unemployment  for the lowest  skilled within each group is likely to occur. 
This would  apply within high-skill groups and low-skill groups.  Uniform 
wages  for workers  within  skill categories  generates  a market where  the 
marginal  workers  within  those  categories  move  in and  out of employ- 
ment with overall variations in the demand for those skill categories.  The 
key notion here is that what we call within-group  wage and employment 
variation is not variation in labor-market outcomes  for identical workers. 
Rather, all of our observed  groups  are very heterogenous  collections  of 
workers with  various  skills and talents.  Variation in wages  and employ- 
ment within  these  groups probably has much more to do with variations 
in individuals  than market-level volatility. 
Table 1 illustrates  what  I think is the  most  compelling  evidence  that 
Table  1  STANDARD  DEVIATIONS  FOR  LOG  WAGES,  LOG  WAGE 
RESIDUALS,  AND LOG  WAGE  CHANGES 
Years  Log Wage Levels  Log Wage  Residuals  Log Wage  Change 
1979-1980  .49  .42  .37 
1986-1987  .56  .47  .40 
1991-1992  .57  .47  .40 
Note: Data are for males  with  1-40  years of potential  labor-market experience  from the matched files of 
the March Current Population  Surveys for 1980-1981,  1987-1988 and 1992-1993. The wage residuals are 
from a log wage  equation  that controls for education,  experience,  marital status, SMSA, and central-city 
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the rising price of skill accounts for the bulk of the rise in wage inequality 
within  groups  and even within individuals  over time. The table gives the 
standard  deviation  of  individual  log  wages,  log  wage  residuals,  and 
individual  log  wage  changes  for three pairs of years: 1979-1980,  1986- 
1987, and  1991-1992.  The data are from matched  records from the U.S. 
Current Population  Survey  and are for adult males that worked  in both 
years.  What I find amazing  is that the time patterns for the three stan- 
dard deviations  are so similar. All of them increase substantially between 
the  first two  pairs  of years  and  remain  roughly  constant  between  the 
second  and third pairs. Moreover, the increases are all of similar magni- 
tude.  The differences,  if anything,  point to the smallest increases  being 
in the within-group  and within-individual  components,  since the largest 
percentage  increase  is  for overall  wage  inequality,  the  next  largest  in- 
crease is in the across-individual  component,  and the smallest increase is 
for the within-individual  component.  The similarity of these increases in 
inequality  is exactly  what  I would  expect  in response  to an increase  in 
the price of skill between  the first two pairs of years and a stable price of 
skill between  the  last  two  pairs of years.  All wage  differentials  would 
move  together.  More-skilled  groups  would  gain on less-skilled  groups, 
and  more-skilled  individuals  would  gain  on  less-skilled  individuals 
within  these  groups. 
What may  seem  odd  to some  is that the variation in individual  wage 
changes  has also increased  as a result of the increase in skill prices. But 
one  must  remember  that this too is consistent  with  a rise in the price of 
skill. Individuals  get paid for what  skills they currently employ  and not 
the skills with which  they are endowed.  Much of the variation in individ- 
ual wages  is due  to people  changing  jobs and moving  up or down  the 
skill ladder. When  inequality  is greater, the wage  changes  generated  by 
moving  up or down  this ladder are correspondingly  greater. This can be 
seen  by looking  at the occupational  component  of the variation in indi- 
vidual  wages  through  time  (defined  as  the  individual's  occupational 
effect in a wage  equation),  Again,  using  the same CPS data, I find that 
98% of the variation in individual  wages  accounted  for by occupation  is 
accounted  for  by  individuals  changing  occupation,  while  only  2% is 
accounted  for by  changes  in  the  occupational  wages  themselves  (i.e., 
individual  variation in wages  is generated  much more by people  chang- 
ing  occupations  than by changing  wages  for the occupations  that they 
are currently  in).  This  evidence  is  why  I think  that  the  skill-demand 
aspect  and  European  wage  rigidities  rather than  the volatility  of labor 
demand  and  restrictions  on mobility  are the key  driving  forces behind 
the U.S.  and European experiences.  This does  not reduce the applicabil- 
ity  of  Bertola and  Ichino's  model,  but  simply  suggests  that  they  may Comment 59 
want to change  the forces and labor-market features that they emphasize 
as most important. 
Finally, Bertola and Ichino's model  stresses  reduced persistence  rather 
than an increase in the magnitude  of demand  shocks as the source of the 
growth  in volatility. My only  comment  on this point is that I have  seen 
no evidence  for the United States that wage  differences  across individu- 
als have  become  less  persistent.  Although  (as Table 1 shows)  the  stan- 
dard deviation  of wage  changes  has increased,  the correlation of individ- 
ual wages  through  time  actually  rises  somewhat  over  the  time  period 
covered  by Table 1. 
Comment 
RICHARD  ROGERSON 
University  of Minnesota 
This is an interesting  paper. The authors undertake the ambitious task of 
presenting  a unifying  explanation  for two  patterns  that have  attracted 
the attention  of many  economists  in recent years: rising unemployment 
in  Europe  and  rising  wage  inequality  in the  United  States.  As  I argue 
below,  their model  also offers an explanation  for the slowdown  in pro- 
ductivity growth  that has been common  to Europe and the United States 
over  the  last  two  decades.  The  authors'  approach  is  to  explain  these 
developments  as the  consequence  of a change  which  is common  to all 
countries  but which  produces  different  responses  across countries  due 
to differences  in labor-market institutions.  The change  in fundamentals 
that they  put forward is an increased  transience  in the economic  situa- 
tion faced by individual  production  units. My comments  focus to a large 
extent on laying out what I believe  to be the leading alternative explana- 
tion, which  is some  form of skill-biased technological  change. 
Consider  first  the  analysis  of  developments  in  the  U.S.  economy. 
Many  authors  have  documented  changes  in relative wages  during  the 
last  thirty  years,  e.g.,  Katz  and  Murphy  (1992),  Murphy  and  Welch 
(1992), and Davis and Haltiwanger  (1993). There are three facts from this 
literature that are relevant to my comments: 
Fact 1.  The differential  between  high-school  and college  graduates  in- 
creased  in the  sixties,  decreased  in the  seventies,  and  has  increased 
steadily  since the late seventies. 
Fact 2.  The  variance  of  wages  within  age  and  schooling  groups  has 
increased  since the late sixties. 
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Fact 3.  For nonproduction  workers  in  manufacturing,  the  increased 
within-group  variance in wages  is largely accounted  for by increases 
within  manufacturing  plants rather than across manufacturing plants. 
Fact 1 is widely  cited and can easily be explained by skill-biased techno- 
logical  change.  This  paper  is  motivated  largely  by  Fact 2  to  look  for 
alternatives  to skill-biased  technological  change.  The authors argue that 
if observationally  identical  workers  are receiving  increasingly  different 
wages,  then  it must  be that something  else  is at work.  In my view,  the 
authors have gone too far in their interpretation of this fact. It leads them 
to  create  a  model  in  which  truly  identical  workers  receive  different 
wages  and in which  these differences grow over time. However,  because 
the  available  worker  characteristics  in  the  relevant  data  sets  are quite 
limited,  workers can be very different and yet be observationally  identi- 
cal from the  perspective  of the  data set.  In fact, I argue that given  the 
presence  of  unobserved  skill  differences  among  workers,  skill-biased 
technological  change  leads  naturally  to an explanation  for both  Fact 1 
and  Fact 2, so that Fact 2 does  not call for an alternative to skill-biased 
technological  change. 
The following  simple  static model  can be used  to illustrate this argu- 
ment.  There are two dimensions  along which  workers differ: ability and 
educational  attainment.  We assume  for simplicity that there are only two 
levels  for each characteristic, resulting in four types  of workers: 
Group  A: High ability, high educational  attainment. 
Group  B: High ability, low educational  attainment. 
Group  C: Low ability, high educational  attainment. 
Group  D: Low ability, low educational  attainment. 
The labor supplied  by each group  is differentiated  in the production 
function.  Additionally,  within  each  group,  individual  worker  i  is  en- 
dowed  with  Ei  units of efficiency labor of that type,  where  Ei  is uniformly 
distributed  on an interval symmetric  about 1. (This is just a convenient 
way  to get  heteroegeneity  of wages  within  each group.)  Here I simply 
take  as  given  the  distribution  of  workers  across  groups.  Presumably 
there  is  some  correlation  between  ability and  educational  attainment, 
but this does  not affect the argument unless  some of the groups contain 
no workers.  Technology  is given  by 
y = f ( K,AA  E  e  + AB  e,  + Ac  E  ei + A  e) 
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where  the A's are relative productivity  weights,  K is physical capital, and 
the summations  are over workers in each group.  A natural assumption 
on  the  A's might  be  AA >  AB >  AC >  AD. This  technology  is not  sufficiently 
rich to capture all the patterns found in the data, but it serves to illustrate 
the main point  of the argument. 
I assume  that only education  and not ability is observed.  It is relatively 
straightforward  to  show  that an increase  in AA  results  in greater wage 
variance within  the high-educational-attainment  group as well as across 
educational  attainment  groups.  Similarly, a decrease  in  AD  leads  to in- 
creased  wage  variance  within  the low-educational-attainment  group  as 
well  as across educational  attainment  groups.  It is therefore easy  to see 
how  skill-biased  technological  change  which  manifests  itself as changes 
in relative productivities  of labor types  can explain both Fact 1 and Fact 
2. (I note that to capture the reversal in relative wages  referred to in Fact 
1 it is  necessary  to  adopt  a production  function  which  allows  for less 
substitutability  across labor types.) 
I find this kind of story to be a rather compelling  explanation for Fact 1 
and  Fact 2.  The  rising  return  to  college  education  strongly  suggests 
greater relative productivity  of workers with certain characteristics, and 
it is extremely  unlikely  that educational  attainment  would  be a perfect 
indicator of how  these  skills were  distributed across the population.  At 
least  qualitatively,  a  story  based  on  skill-biased  technological  change 
explains both facts. On the other hand,  the story of increased transience 
in economic  conditions  put  forward by Bertola and  Ichino can explain 
Fact 2 but  does  not  seem  to readily explain  Fact 1. Hence,  it does  not 
really offer a true alternative to skill-biased technological  change. 
Fact 3  is  also  an  important  piece  of  information  for  distinguishing 
between  the  two  stories.  In the  model  of Bertola and  Ichino  all differ- 
ences  in wages  are accounted  for by differences  in wages  across firms. 
As  Fact  3  indicates,  however,  this  cannot  be  the  whole  story,  since 
within-plant  wage  variance is the dominant  factor in explaining  the in- 
creased variance of wages  for nonproduction  workers.  It is not difficult, 
however,  for versions  of the skill-biased  technological  change  to match 
this finding. 
I should  point  out  that the  story of skill-biased  technological  change 
that I have outlined  above is not really complete.  One issue  is that firms 
presumably  are able to choose  the technologies  that they  operate,  and 
hence  it is not  appropriate  to take this  technological  change  as exoge- 
nous.  A  slightly  different  story but with  similar implications  has been 
examined  by  Krusell,  Ohanian,  Rios-Rull,  and  Violante  (1995).  They 
argue  that if skilled  labor is complementary  with  physical  capital,  and 
unskilled  labor is substitutable  with  physical  capital, then the declining 62 *  ROGERSON 
price in physical  capital that has been documented  implies an increasing 
relative demand  for skilled workers. 
While  I think  the  above  facts favor skill-biased  technological  change 
over increasing  transience,  it does  not follow  that the latter may not be 
an important  phenomenon,  and thus it is still of interest to examine  the 
alternative that the authors have put forward in this paper. This leads us 
to look for other implications  of the authors' model that we can examine 
for evidence  of increasing  variability in the economic  environment  faced 
by individual  firms, or, in the authors' notation,  increases in the parame- 
ter p.  One is led naturally (although,  as it turns out, incorrectly) to look 
for increases  in the  reallocation  of workers  across establishments,  i.e., 
increases  in  the  rates of job creation  and  destruction.  There is no  evi- 
dence  to suggest  an increase in these  rates for the United States over the 
last twenty  years.  However,  the model  predicts an inverted-U  relation- 
ship between  job creation (or destruction)  and the parameter p,  so that 
constancy  of  these  rates  is  at least  consistent  with  the  U.S.  economy 
being  near the peak of this curve. 
There  are several  other  implications  of  increases  in p  that could  be 
checked  against the available evidence: 
1.  There should  be increased  dispersion  in plant-level  productivities. 
2.  Newly  created or destroyed  jobs should  be less persistent. 
3.  Plant-level  productivity  should  be less persistent. 
4.  The plant-size  wage  differential should  increase. 
Davis,  Haltiwanger,  and Schuh (1994) show  that statement 2 is not true, 
at least for manufacturing.  On the other hand,  statement  4 is shown  to 
be  true  for manufacturing  in  Davis  and  Haltiwanger  (1993). I am  not 
aware  of  any  definitive  evidence  for points  1 and  3,  but  some  of  the 
findings  in Baily, Hulten,  and Campbell (1992) and Dwyer (1994) indicate 
some  support  for 1 though  not for 3. Clearly a more extensive  analysis of 
these  factors is called for. 
I mentioned  earlier that the authors' model also predicts slower produc- 
tivity growth in the face of increases in p. As p increases there is less incen- 
tive  for  workers  to  move  from  currently  low-productivity  units  to 
currently high-productivity  units,  because  the increase in p makes it less 
worthwhile  to incur the moving cost. As a result, as p increases, the alloca- 
tion of labor at a point in time becomes worse from the perspective of maxi- 
mizing current output.  This should show up as a decrease in productivity. 
One of the nice features of the analysis for the case of the United States 
is that the model  makes strong predictions which can be examined using 
available  data.  The analysis  that pertains  to European labor markets is 
much less rich in this sense.  By assumption,  all workers receive the same Discussion ?  63 
wage  in that model.  Obviously,  how  unemployment  responds  to shocks 
will depend  very much  on how  this wage  rate responds  to shocks,  and 
hence  any  story  of changes  in European  unemployment  must  at least 
take  some  stand  on  how  wages  are determined.  Over  the  last twenty 
years  wages  have  continued  to rise in Europe,  so  it is not  accurate to 
simply  assume  that rigid wages  are the problem. 
I raise three other points  concerning  the analysis  of developments  in 
Europe. First, note that given  the assumptions  characterizing the opera- 
tion of European labor markets, it is also true that skill-biased technologi- 
cal change  would  give  rise to higher  unemployment.  Second,  a slight 
variation  on  the  wage-compression  story  for Europe is that it is mini- 
mum  wages  which  are the  constraint  in adjusting  to the increase  in p, 
rather than the average level of wages.  Third, it would  also be of interest 
to see  to what  extent  the facts about wage  variance are true for a larger 
sample  of European countries. 
In summary, I think that the authors do a good job of laying out a new 
unified  explanation  for  some  very  important  developments  that have 
occurred  in  the  last  two  decades.  While  their explanation  holds  some 
promise,  however,  they  have  yet  to  demonstrate  that  it  outperforms 
what  seems  to be the leading  alternative. 
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been  made intentionally  simple in order to focus on the effects of differ- 
ences  in labor-market institutions.  The hope  was that this model  would 
be  useful  in  explaining  the  component  of wage  inequality  which  had 
been  most  difficult  to rationalize  by more conventional  approaches.  In 
particular,  Bertola  noted  that  detailed  empirical  work  by  Davis  and 
Haltiwanger,  as  well  as  other  research  mentioned  by  the  discussants, 
had  stressed  the  importance  of  job-specific  (as  opposed  to  worker- 
specific) uncertainty; job-specific uncertainty is the type captured by the 
Bertola-Ichino  model.  On  the  other hand,  Bertola said,  the increasing 
idiosyncratic  uncertainty  which  they  postulate  (i.e.,  increases  in  the 
model parameter p) need not be completely  unrelated to stories stressing 
skill-biased  technological  progress,  etc.; increasing  idiosyncratic  uncer- 
tainty might  itself be a result of broader changes  in the market environ- 
ment,  technology,  or trade patterns. 
Bob  Hall  observed  that  there  were  a  number  of  possible  schemes 
which  would  effectively  vitiate the European antifiring laws.  For exam- 
ple,  the worker and the firm could draw up an agreement  at hiring time 
that gives  either party the right to initiate a separation. If this is impracti- 
cal or illegal,  then  the firm could  try to find a new  job for a redundant 
worker at another  firm and thus avoid  the penalty  imposed  for firing a 
worker. A third possibility  is for the firm to diversify either by entering 
an industry which  requires employment  growth or by acquiring growing 
firms. Hall asked if any of these  tactics were illegal in Europe. 
Bertola responded  that it is illegal to draw up an agreement at the time 
of  hiring  by  which  the  worker  gives  up  his  right  not  to  be  fired.  A 
separation  agreement  signed  at the  time  of  firing  would  not  be  very 
useful,  since  at that point  the worker could  extract the full value  of his 
tenure  rights with  the firm. Bertola agreed that diversification  would  be 
a sensible  way  of avoiding  the no-firing constraint.  However,  there are 
factors working  against diversification; for example,  if a poorly perform- 
ing  firm  joins  with  a  profitable  firm,  the  former  will  lose  the  public 
subsidies  that European governments  often extend to companies  in dire 
straits.  Overall,  Bertola  agreed  that  market  pressures  and  political 
changes  were  moving  European labor markets toward greater flexibility 
(the  authors  explore  this  point  in a related paper),  but he  argued  that 
labor-market institutions  remain generally more rigid in Europe than in 
the U.S. 
Kevin Murphy  suggested  that the important part of the authors' story 
about  Europe  was  the  wage  floor and  not  the  no-firing  constraint.  He 
argued that-as  in cities with binding rent controls, where people  rarely 
move  because  of  the  difficulty  of finding  another  apartment-the  low 
worker  mobility  in the rigid version  of the Bertola-Ichino  model  arises Discussion  *  65 
because  firms are less  willing  to hire than in the flexible version  of the 
model.  He  noted  that  the  homogeneous-worker  assumption  made  by 
the authors  eliminates  an important  distortion  of a European-style  sys- 
tem,  which  is that low  rates of job shopping  lead  to poor matches  be- 
tween  specific  workers  and jobs.  In other words,  the wage  floor leads 
not  only  to  the  wrong  number  of  workers  being  allocated  to  each 
sector-the  point  emphasized  by this paper-but  it also creates ineffi- 
ciencies  in who  gets allocated where. 
Ben Bernanke suggested  that in future work the authors should  write 
down  and  explicitly  solve  the model  assuming  risk-averse  (rather than 
risk-neutral)  agents;  although  intuitively  the  European  system  seems 
more risk-averse  than the American system,  because  of its inefficiencies 
it  is  far from  obvious  that  the  European  system  is  optimal  or  near- 
optimal  even  with  risk-averse  workers.  He also suggested  that the  au- 
thors  should  use  their setup  to address  the issues  of capital formation 
and capital "shortage" in Europe. 
Jan Eberly picked  up  on  the  capital-accumulation  issue  and  pointed 
out that, by extending  their analysis to include capital accumulation,  the 
authors  might  be able to develop  some  corroborating evidence  for their 
approach.  In particular, since  according  to their model  labor is a more 
fixed  factor in  Europe  than  in  the  United  States,  in  the  face  of  rising 
uncertainty  European  firms should  have  a greater propensity  to switch 
out of labor into  capital. Therefore,  it might be worthwhile  to compare 
capital formation  data in Europe and the United  States over the recent 
period.  Bertola said they would  try this, but noted that the interpretation 
of the  results  would  depend  significantly  on whether  capital and labor 
are thought  to be complements  or substitutes. 
John  Shea  cited  some  recent  studies  that  show  that  the  degree  of 
mobility in the income  distribution is not going up, and for less-educated 
workers  is  even  going  down.  Less-educated  people  today  are  more 
likely  to remain  at their initial position  in the income  distribution  than 
were  similarly educated  people  in the 1960s. Is this observation  consis- 
tent with increasing  idiosyncratic uncertainty? 
Daron Acemoglu  observed  that the ratio of unskilled  to skilled unem- 
ployment  in Europe  should  be higher  than in the United  States,  given 
the imposed  rigidity of relative wages.  However,  there is very little evi- 
dence  that this ratio is in fact higher in Europe. Bertola responded  that 
this observation  might be true for the conventional  skill-based story, but 
their model  does  not predict any specific difference in this ratio. 
Walter Wasserfallen felt that it was not useful to refer to Europe as if it 
were  a single  entity.  The  legal  and  institutional  frameworks  are quite 
different  across European  states.  At the same time,  the fact of very low 66 *  DISCUSSION 
labor mobility relative to the United States seems  to hold for all European 
countries.  Bertola responded  by suggesting  that the intra-European varia- 
tion  in  institutional  frameworks,  while  real,  is much  smaller  than  the 
difference  between  Europe and the United States. 
Larry Kotlikoff asked  if European  firms provide  bonuses  to workers 
for early  retirement.  Bertola answered  that they  could  and  that  some 
firms  had  adopted  this  practice.  However,  he  noted  that  bonus  pro- 
grams were  sufficiently  expensive  that there was not much difference to 
the firm between  inducing  an early retirement and keeping  the worker 
around for a few more years. Bob Hall noted  that there would  be a huge 
difference  from a social perspective  if the inefficient continuation  of em- 
ployment  could  be  resolved  by  writing  an  efficient  contract.  Bertola 
agreed,  but he expressed  the view  that European workers are less likely 
to  start  a  second  career after  an  early  retirement  than  are American 
workers. 